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Medical Device Artificial Intelligence:  
The New Tort Frontier 
Charlotte A. Tschider 
The Machine is much, but it is not everything.1  
– E. M. Forster 
The medical device industry and new technology start-ups 
have dramatically increased investment in artificial intelligence 
(AI) applications, including diagnostic tools and AI-enabled 
devices. These technologies have been positioned to reduce 
climbing health costs while simultaneously improving health 
outcomes. Technologies like AI-enabled surgical robots, AI-
enabled insulin pumps, and cancer detection applications hold 
tremendous promise, yet without appropriate oversight, they will 
likely pose major safety issues. While preventative safety measures 
may reduce risk to patients using these technologies, effective 
regulatory-tort regimes also permit recovery when preventative 
solutions are insufficient. 
 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
administrative agency responsible for overseeing the safety and 
efficacy of medical devices, has not effectively addressed AI system 
safety issues for its clearance processes. If the FDA cannot 
reasonably reduce the risk of injury for AI-enabled medical 
devices, injured patients should be able to rely on ex post recovery 
options, as in products liability cases. However, the Medical 
Device Amendments Act (MDA) of 1976 introduced an express 
preemption clause that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted to 
 
  Charlotte A. Tschider is an Assistant Professor of Law for the Loyola University 
School of Law and a member of the Beazley Institute for Health Law & Policy. The Author 
would like to thank Wendy Netter Epstein, Jordan Paradise, Nadia Sawicki, Cynthia Ho, 
Andrew Torrance, Blackford Middleton, W. Nicholson Price II, Andrew Selbst, the attendees 
of the 2018 Wiet Law and the Biosciences Conference, and the 2019 ASLME Health Law 
Professors conference attendees for their ideas and feedback in the early shaping and 
development of this paper. 
 1. E.M. FORSTER, THE MACHINE STOPS 2 (1909), 
https://www.ele.uri.edu/faculty/vetter/Other-stuff/The-Machine-Stops.pdf. 
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nearly foreclose liability claims, based almost completely on the 
comprehensiveness of FDA clearance review processes. At its 
inception, MDA preemption aimed to balance consumer interests 
in safe medical devices with efficient, consistent regulation to 
promote innovation and reduce costs. 
 
Although preemption remains an important mechanism for 
balancing injury risks with device availability, the introduction of 
AI software dramatically changes the risk profile for medical 
devices. Due to the inherent opacity and changeability of AI 
algorithms powering AI machines, it is nearly impossible to 
predict all potential safety hazards a faulty AI system might pose 
to patients. This Article identifies key preemption issues for AI 
machines as they affect ex ante and ex post regulatory-tort 
allocation, including actual FDA review for parallel claims, 
bifurcation of software and device reviews, and dynamics of the 
technology itself that may enable plaintiffs to avoid preemption. 
This Author then recommends an alternative conception of the 
regulatory-tort allocation for AI machines that will create a more 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2018, Corindus Vascular Robotics made an 
important announcement: the creation of a telerobotic surgical 
  
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1554 
system.2 The CorPath surgical robot had conducted its first “in-
human” non-surgical health intervention for percutaneous 
coronary intervention (PCI).3 PCI, or coronary angioplasty, 
involves inserting a catheter into a patient’s coronary arteries and 
placing a stent to promote blood flow.4 The medical procedure is 
fairly routine, but CorPath’s solution is not: the surgical robot is 
controlled remotely by a physician in a different geographic 
location, aided by artificial intelligence (AI) technology.5 While 
CorPath has the potential to transform healthcare, especially for 
patients in developing countries and rural locations, it also has the 
potential to cause serious injuries. 
The AI healthcare industry is quickly developing as medical 
device manufacturers take advantage of rapid advancements in AI 
technologies, including machine learning, neural networking, and 
deep learning. And the investment marketplace has taken note. 
Forbes Insights has labeled AI and healthcare a “giant opportunity,”6 
with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 28% 
accelerating over the next five years, and 49% of that growth in 
North America.7 Medical device companies are considered a 
relatively sound investment, with margins consistently between 
20–30%.8 With a backdrop of nearly 10% of venture capital in AI 
technology development, it is no wonder that healthcare would see 
 
 2. Corindus’ Technology Successfully Used in World’s First-in-Human Telerobotic 




 3. Id. 
 4. Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI or Angioplasty with Stent), HEART & STROKE 
FOUND. OF CAN., https://www.heartandstroke.ca/heart/treatments/surgery-and-other-
procedures/percutaneous-coronary-intervention (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
 5. See Corindus’ Technology Successfully Used in World’s First-in-Human Telerobotic 
Coronary Intervention, supra note 2; Press Release, Corindus Vascular Robotics, Corindus 
Receives FDA Clearance for First Automated Robotic Movement in technIQ™ Series for 
CorPath GRX Platform (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.corindus.com/news-events/press-
releases/corindus-receives-fda-clearance-for-first-automated-robotic-movement-in-
techniq-series-for-corpath-grx-platform. 
 6. AI and Healthcare: A Giant Opportunity, FORBES INSIGHTS (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/02/11/ai-and-healthcare-a-giant-
opportunity/. 
 7. Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) Market in Healthcare Sector 2019–2023, 
BUSINESSWIRE (Aug. 23, 2019, 12:52 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20190822005747/en/Global-Artificial-Intelligence-AI-Market-Healthcare-Sector. 
 8. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 208 (2017), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/jun17_ch7.pdf. 
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a share of that investment, approximated to grow to $6.6 billion 
annually by 2021.9  
Accompanying this investment opportunity is its share of 
concerns. Pending lawsuits related to the Tesla self-driving car 
have raised the profile of design flaws in AI, revealing the potential 
for AI to cause catastrophic injury in any number of sectors.10 The 
inherent “black-box” nature of AI algorithms, coupled with their 
potential to self-learn, or what I will call dynamic inscrutability, 
complicates the ability of both manufacturers and regulators to 
actually understand whether these algorithms are safe and 
effective.11 Healthcare is not immune from these issues, and the 
FDA has not done much to assuage attendant concerns.12 
The FDA, an agency that regulates nearly $2.4 trillion worth of 
consumer goods, has regulated food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical 
devices since 1938,13 with a more extensive role in medical device 
oversight since 1976. As of 2019, the U.S. medical device market has 
grown to $156 billion in medical devices,14 roughly 4–6% of total 
U.S. spending on healthcare.15 According to Medicare spending 
reports in 2014, hospitals spent $14 billion on implantable medical 
devices for Medicare patients.16 Based on cost alone, the medical 
device industry, and its potential impact on patients, is incredibly 
significant. 
As part of the 1976 Medical Devices Amendments Act (MDA), 
which established a model for medical device oversight, Congress 
included an express preemption provision barring civil liability 
actions where injuries resulted from failure to meet requirements 
 
 9. See AI and Healthcare: A Giant Opportunity, supra note 6; Jeb Su, Venture Capital 
Funding for Artificial Intelligence Startups Hit Record High in 2018, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2019, 2:58 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2019/02/12/venture-capital-funding-
for-artificial-intelligence-startups-hit-record-high-in-2018/. 
 10. Lance Eliot, Tesla Crash Lawsuit Nails the Achilles Heel of Driverless Cars, FORBES 
(May 5, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/2019/05/05/tesla-
crash-lawsuit-nails-the-achilles-heel-of-driverless-cars/. 
 11. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015) 
(introducing the concept of black-box medicine). 
 12. See infra Parts II and III and accompanying notes. 
 13. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a. 
 14. U.S. Medical Device Market Reaches $156 Billion Mark, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 
4, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-medical-device-
market-reaches-156-billion-mark-300805696.html. 
 15. See MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 209. 
 16. Id. at 208. 
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“different from” or “in addition to” federal requirements.17 At the 
time, it was expected that the FDA could completely regulate the 
medical device industry, a task that is increasingly more difficult 
with a substantial variety of devices on the market, in larger 
numbers, and with a wide range of potential threats and attendant 
risks.18  
This preemption language was reinforced in the Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr (1996)19 and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008)20 cases, where the 
Supreme Court held that MDA expressly preempted both explicit 
state statutory requirements and common law tort actions that are 
different from or add to federal requirements. The net effect, 
combined with an implied conflict preemption case, Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (2001),21 is that medical device injuries, at 
least those caused by devices that have undergone extensive FDA 
review, are nearly non-recoverable except in very limited 
circumstances.22 Specifically, tort actions may only be brought 
when non-compliance with a federal requirement is demonstrated 
in pleadings: a so-called “parallel claim.”23 
The combined challenges of a new technology environment that 
could pose catastrophic injury to the public, a lack of extensive FDA 
expertise and oversight, and a heavy preemption framework raise 
major concerns for the future of patient safety and injury 
compensation for AI machines. The future of technology 
innovation depends heavily on confidence in the safety system. 
Without an effective regulatory-tort allocation model, 
manufacturers may not create life-saving devices due to upfront 
regulatory compliance expense, and without regulatory oversight, 
patients and physicians may forego cutting-edge solutions due to 
safety concerns.  
This Article responds to calls for examination of the tort system 
with respect to software technologies using AI as a recent example 
of a longstanding challenge: addressing the viability of tort 
 
 17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c–360n. 
 18. See MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 212 (citing JAMES C. ROBINSON, PURCHASING 
MEDICAL INNOVATION (2015)). 
 19. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 20. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 21. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 22. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 23. See infra text accompanying note 128 (describing the parallel claim exception for 
preemption). 
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recovery for medical devices within the narrow margin left by the 
Lohr, Riegel, and Buckman cases (the “preemption trilogy”).24 An 
effective regulatory-tort allocation model, involving reinforcing 
preventative and responsive legal modes, will collectively promote 
innovation and reinforce consumer confidence by effectively boot-
strapping safety measures and providing injury compensation. An 
effective model should permit patients who will not benefit from 
regulatory activity and otherwise may be left without 
compensation for their injuries to successfully plead a case that 
survives summary judgment, with the reasonable goal for parties 
to engage in discovery related to actual device design failures.25 
Although resolving the question of tort viability after preemption 
is a valuable effort, this Author will not do so here. 
Part I introduces the basics of AI software, specifically the 
opaque and inscrutable “black-box” nature of AI algorithms, 
paired with the dynamic and adaptive capacity of AI to self-learn.26 
AI software is fundamentally different from historically regulated 
medical devices, and these differences may inform where 
opportunities are available for tort recovery within MDA 
preemption doctrine. Part II recounts the current and insufficient 
state of FDA regulation, including the structure and requirements 
that form the premarket approval (PMA) process, the most 
restrictive and comprehensive of FDA reviews and the principal 
motivator for express preemption doctrine. I then discuss the 
inherent regulatory limitations of FDA processes for preventing AI 
medical device injuries, including structural limitations and design 
insufficiencies. Part III discusses the nature of the regulatory-tort 
bargain, specifically risk allocation, as the motivating factor for 
preemption and identifies how tort recovery is central to this risk 
allocation for emerging technologies like AI. Part IV applies these 
arguments against the existing FDA processes to propose a three-
party inquiry, involving structural, design, and technology 
 
 24. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 429–
30 (2017). 
 25. I will note that this Article does not examine potential tort liability related to 
labeling. Rather, it addresses concerns related to design-based injuries, largely because 
failure to warn and other labeling claims have shown likely to be dismissed by circuit courts. 
See, e.g., infra note 128. 
 26. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (introducing the concept of algorithms as 
a black box and describing the range of uses in everyday life for algorithms in decision-
making). 
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considerations that courts can use to effectively analyze 
preemption claims.27  
I. AI TECHNOLOGY AND THE FDA 
Although the term “artificial intelligence” calls to mind popular 
science fiction, such as the advanced AI system from 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, Hal, or the humanoid replicants in Blade Runner, current 
AI algorithms function more like human-designed algorithms 
combined with the ability to change and adapt themselves based 
on changing data inputs and feedback loops.28 The most common 
AI model used today is an algorithm or system of algorithms based 
on data supplied, or machine learning.29 Machine learning is an 
application of AI where a computer program, the machine-learning 
utility or software, evaluates a large volume of data to identify 
relationships between data elements, creating a machine-generated 
algorithm informed by the data.30 Because the data collected will 
likely change, this machine-generated algorithm updates 
automatically as new data collected through use alter these 
relationships, presumably making the algorithm more effective 
over time. 
 
 27. Please note: this Article is designed to expand thinking on new technology, 
especially software-based technologies reviewed by the FDA with respect to torts. AI offers 
a useful example for illustrating one technology that the FDA has not yet adequately 
regulated, as well as the likelihood of potential downstream injuries. 
 28. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968); BLADE RUNNER (Warner 
Bros. 1982); Mindy Weisberger, Why You Shouldn’t Expect to See “Blade Runner” Replicants 
Anytime Soon, LIVE SCI. (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.livescience.com/60703-no-blade-
runner-replicants-yet.html; Bobby Azarian, The Myth of Sentient Machines, PSYCH. TODAY 
(June 1, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/mind-in-the-machine/
201606/the-myth-sentient-machines. Although Elon Musk and the late Stephen Hawking 
have warned of AI’s dangers in sentience, it seems unlikely that machines able to make 
decisions on more than one topic, “artificial general intelligence,” could be years or decades 
in the future. Still, these machines may not operate with human-like intelligence. Anthony 
Cuthbertson, Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking Warn of Artificial Intelligence Arms Race, 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:09 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/ai-asilomar-principles-
artificial-intelligence-elon-musk-550525; How Far Away Are We Really from Artificial 
Intelligence?, TECHNATIVE (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.technative.io/how-far-away-are-
we-really-from-artificial-intelligence/. 
 29. Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning?, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/. 
 30. Libby Kinsey, A Machine Learning Primer, MEDIUM (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@libbykinsey/a-machine-learning-primer-6d7b5a96a3b0. 
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One example of an AI-enabled medical device is the QuantX 
platform.31 QuantX reviews breast cancer images using an 
increasing collection of data related to these images to recommend 
when breast cancer seems likely, according to imaging scans.32 
QuantX requires radiologists to validate diagnoses, prompting a 
lower potential risk to patients and correspondingly less 
comprehensive Food and Drug Administration review,33 but it is 
not hard to imagine systems in the future that either automate 
analysis or provide these diagnoses to medical practitioners who 
do not have an oncology specialization.34  
When an AI utility, or software program, leverages computing 
power to evaluate relationships between data elements in a big data 
repository, the AI software may identify previously unconsidered 
or novel relationships, which create a complex, system-generated 
algorithm.35 The QuantX system, for example, is likely trained on 
images with positive breast cancer diagnoses and images with 
negative breast cancer diagnoses. As more accurate diagnoses and 
images are fed into the system, the AI algorithm should become 
more accurate through self-learning.36 These images may include 
hundreds or thousands of unique data points related to the images, 
captured with a variety of machines and machine operators, across 
a wide population of human beings with variable physiological 
characteristics.37  
 
 31. QUANTITATIVE INSIGHTS, Efficiently Incorporating AI into the Clinical Workflow 
(2019), https://www.qlarityimaging.com/next-gen-integration. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. It should be noted that QuantX has been designated as Class II, a lower-risk 
classification, likely because of the radiologist’s involvement in diagnosis. Berkman Sahiner, 
Aria Pezeshk & Nicholas Petrick, An Update on FDA Perspectives for Machine Learning in 
Medical Image Interpretation, SIIM (2018), https://cdn.ymaws.com/siim.org/resource/
resmgr/mimi18/presentations/18cmimi-sahiner.pdf. 
 35. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE 
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 7 (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/
documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf. 
 36. Alejandro Rodríguez-Ruiz, Elizabeth Krupinski, Jan-Jurre Mordang, Kathy 
Schilling, Sylvia H. Heywang-Köbrunner, Ioannis Sechopoulos & Ritse M. Mann, Detection 
of Breast Cancer with Mammography: Effect of an Artificial Intelligence Support System, 290 
RADIOLOGY 1, 6 (2018). 
 37. Id. at 2. Although this example involves over 100 images, many imaging solutions 
include thousands of images. See, e.g., Wenya Linda Bi, Ahmed Hosny, Matthew B. Schabath, 
Maryellen L. Giger, Nicolai J. Birkbak, Alireza Mehrtash, Tavis Allison, Omar Arnaout, 
Christopher Abbosh, Ian F. Dunn, Raymond H. Mak, Rulla M. Tamimi, Clare M. Tempany, 
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To be reasonably accurate, algorithms must accommodate 
human variations as well as different radiological imaging 
practices. The result is a highly complex algorithm or algorithms, 
which must adapt and change to integrate new data as it is 
supplied.38 This continuous updating, or tuning, may be labeled 
dynamic for our purposes, as the QuantX algorithm in operation 
when it was first released has learned, through new data, to create 
the algorithm used today. Humans, however, are not usually 
involved in this change: AI learns independently of its creator. 
A. Artificial Intelligence Systems Create Dynamically  
Inscrutable Algorithms 
Machine learning may be implemented as supervised or 
unsupervised learning systems. In supervised learning systems, 
data scientists are involved in labeling and otherwise restricting the 
function of the machine learning utility.39 In unsupervised learning 
systems, unlike supervised learning systems, data scientists do not 
restrict utility function to a specific model, and the machine 
learning utility can leverage any data available to it.40  
When a machine learning utility has fewer constraints, it creates 
algorithms that may be highly complex and partially or completely 
inscrutable to data scientists—an inherent opacity.41 The net effect 
of unsupervised learning systems, which are frequently used in AI-
enabled medical devices like QuantX, is that creators can no longer 
understand their creations as the algorithms themselves become 
complex and unreadable.42 When creators can no longer 
understand how their creations work, and those creations have 
 
Charles Swanton, Udo Hoffmann, Lawrence H. Schwartz, Robert J. Gillies, Raymond Y. 
Huang & Hugo J.W.L. Aerts, Artificial Intelligence in Cancer Imaging: Clinical Challenges and 
Applications, 69 CA: CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 127, 133 tbl.1 (2019) (listing the number of 
images associated with specific cancer applications). 
 38. Tom Grigg, Algorithmic Complexity [101], MEDIUM (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/algorithmic-complexity-101-28b567cc335b. 
 39. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., supra note 35, at 7. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Inscrutability, or opacity, results from complex interrelated rules as well as some 
of the techniques employed when designing the algorithm. These algorithms are 
distinguished from strategic opacity, as in trade secrecy. Price, supra note 24, at 430. 
 42. Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning 
Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 4 (2016). 
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materially changed, new risks to patient safety arise, often after 
FDA approval.43 
Algorithmic complexity may result not only from the vast 
multitude of relationships between data elements but also from the 
relevant weightings of the elements, or the number of “neurons” in 
the case of a more advanced AI neural network.44 Neural networks 
are more advanced AI systems than their machine learning 
relatives. Neurons, or nodes, in a network make calculations based 
on their relationship to other neurons, often within several layers 
of intelligence. Because deep learning involves more complex 
neural networks with several layers, some of which may be hidden, 
it can identify more complex relationships between data in the 
layers.45  
Medical researchers are increasingly using neural networks to 
solve more complex imaging problems.46 One example, led by 
Massachusetts General, required the use of 50,000 MRI brain scans 
just to train a single neural network, which has resulted in better, 
faster, and more accurate imaging processes.47 Neural networks 
and deep learning networks exhibit an even higher level of 
complexity due to weighting for data sets within a number of 
 
 43. FDA regulatory processes involve both pre- and postmarket activities. Where a 
premarket activity, such as the PMA process, might not catch a potential issue until the 
algorithm has learned on real-world data, postmarket activity should be able to detect and 
respond to these issues. Often the FDA requires any number of actions after manufacturer 
notification, such as deploying a fix, stopping additional sales, or recalling devices. See U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Postmarket Information—Device Surveillance and Reporting Processes 
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/human-factors-and-medical-
devices/postmarket-information-device-surveillance-and-reporting-processes. 
Unfortunately, if functionality is inscrutable due to inherent technical complexity, even data 
scientists may not be able to determine whether an issue will arise and how to minimize 
harm to patients. See Burrell, supra note 42, at 5. 
 44. Neurons are specific functioning units of a neural network, a more advanced 
version of an AI utility. See Mingzhe Chen, Ursula Challita, Walid Saad, Changchuan Yin & 
Mérouane Debbah, Artificial Neural Networks-Based Machine Learning for Wireless Networks: A 
Tutorial, 21 IEEE COMMC’NS SURVS. TUTORIALS 3039, 3058 (2019); Brian K. Lee, Justin Lessler 
& Elizabeth A. Stuart, Improving Propensity Score Weighting Using Machine Learning, 29 STAT. 
MED. 337 (2010). 
 45. See Fei Jiang, Yong Jiang, Hui Zhiuh, Yi Dong, Hao Li, Sufeng Ma, Yilong Wang, 
Qiang Dong, Haipeng Shen & Yongjun Wang, Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present 
and Future, 2 STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230, 237 (2017). 
 46. Jeff Lagasse, FDA Approves First AI Tool for Detecting Retinopathy, NIH Shows 
Machine Learning Success in Imaging, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/fda-approves-first-ai-tool-detecting-
retinopathy-nih-shows-machine-learning-success-imaging. 
 47. Id. 
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layers.48 Systems with a greater number of layers generally produce 
more accurate decisions and more complex algorithms. 
B. Infrastructure Complexity Increases Overall Artificial  
Intelligence Complexity 
Algorithmic complexity not only results from ephemeral data 
element relationships and weightings, but it also results from the 
complexity of the code and machine communication itself. As 
suggested by Alan Turing, computers require a more efficient 
mechanism for communication in high-powered systems via high-
level coding languages.49 The development of complex computer 
codes from the 1960s through the 1980s enabled these operations, 
continuing to increase efficiency in recent years.50 Modern machine 
learning utilities often leverage Python, C++, R, JavaScript, and 
Julia coding languages.51 Machines must also communicate with 
other machines, specifically when an AI system directs an 
additional medical device or computer system to function in some 
way, an artificially intelligent machine (AI machine).52 
Machine to machine communication, or M2M, adds further 
complexity to inherent coding and algorithmic complexity.53 
Because human languages are highly inefficient for computers 
using higher order mathematics, M2M languages enable computers 
to communicate more efficiently using a shorthand computer-
readable language, especially for devices connected to one-
another.54 When algorithms prompt activity within a computer 
 
 48. See Burrell, supra note 42, at 5. 
 49. See Stephen Muggleton, Alan Turing and the Development of Artificial Intelligence, 27 
AI COMMC’NS 3, 4 (2014). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Nick Heath, GitHub: The Top 10 Programming Languages for Machine Learning, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/github-the-top-10-
programming-languages-for-machine-learning/. 
 52. The Author adopts this name to distinguish between AI standalone system and 
physical devices directed remotely by AI, which may or may not include the robotics field. 
For purposes of this Article, AI machine means an AI-enabled medical device inclusive of 
diagnostic applications and connected physical devices with AI capabilities. It should be 
noted that historically AI has been analyzed principally as “robotics,” although “AI 
machine” as it is used in this Article is inclusive of robotics applications, such as surgical 
robots. 
 53. John Breeden II, What Is M2M, and Why Is It the Future of Code?, GCN (Mar. 22, 
2013), https://gcn.com/articles/2013/03/22/m2m-future-of-code.aspx. 
 54. Jen Clark, What is M2M Technology, IBM BLOG (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/what-is-m2m-technology/. 
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system or to standalone devices, such as Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices or robotics, M2M is used to deliver the message over 
wireless or cellular-enabled networks.55 This technology makes it 
feasible to communicate between a central system housing AI-
generated algorithms and receiving devices that are distributed 
remotely.56 Further, interconnected devices running on the same 
network may communicate with each other, such as an insulin 
pump sharing information with a pacemaker.57 Figure 1 illustrates 
this infrastructure. 
 
FIGURE 1: AI MEDICAL DEVICE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 
C. Artificial Intelligence Is Created by Humans and Compromised  
by Humans 
Although AI is designed to be inherently self-learning, 
distinctly human choices in their design dramatically affect 
 
 55. Andrew Parker, Intelligent Connectivity: The Fusion of 5G, AI and IoT, GSMA (Sept. 
7, 2018), https://www.gsma.com/iot/news/intelligent-connectivity-5g-ai-iot/; Chen et al., 
supra note 44. 
 56. See Chen et al., supra note 44 at 3043. 
 57. PLASMATIC TECHS., Smart Home Interoperability: The Key Hurdles, IOT FOR ALL (Mar. 
1, 2019), https://www.iotforall.com/smart-home-interoperability-key-hurdles/. 
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performance.58 Designing an AI system is no trivial task, filled with 
choices that can increase or decrease safety.59 Data scientists not 
only must make choices in designing the AI software but must also 
develop methods for the software to identify changes or receive 
feedback to “tune” the system. Facially, therefore, it is impossible 
to determine which algorithms are high quality or safe.60 Without 
effective feedback loops, the software cannot become more 
effective or be safe for new patient populations.  
Relevant choices for machine learning applications include 
code selection, database structure, training data sets, rule design, 
machine learning training, and ongoing system updates.61 
Technology that integrates AI into its functionality requires design, 
testing, and user feedback—more comprehensively and 
continuously than existing FDA technology submitted for review.62 
Further, AI machines may be exposed to cybersecurity risks at a 
greater frequency: the dynamic inscrutability of AI systems makes 
them even more vulnerable to cyberattacks because unauthorized 
changes to the underlying data sets or the algorithm may not be 
noticeable until after injuries occur.63 
When AI utilities run on geographically dispersed, or remote, 
systems, additional selections must be made, including the 
communication languages and models for transmitting data and 
direction to devices and transmitting data from devices to the AI 
 
 58. See Chen et al., supra note 44, at 3049. 
 59. Richard Harris, How Can We Be Sure Artificial Intelligence Is Safe for Medical Use?, 
NPR (Apr. 14, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/14/
711775543/how-can-we-be-sure-artificial-intelligence-is-safe-for-medical-use; Why AI 
Safety?, MACH. INTEL. RSCH. INST., https://intelligence.org/why-ai-safety/ (last visited Feb. 
16, 2021). 
 60. See Price, supra note 24, at 433. 
 61. Martin Zinkevich, Rules of Machine Learning: Best Practices for ML Engineering, 
Invited Talk at Reliable Mach. Learning in the Wild (Dec. 2016), 
http://martin.zinkevich.org/rules_of_ml/rules_of_ml.pdf. 
 62. Jiang et al., supra note 45, at 241 (2017); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 104 (2017) (describing the lack of standards setting bodies for identifying 
appropriate testing thresholds). 
 63. Meg King & Jacob Rosen, The Real Challenges of Artificial Intelligence: Automating 
Cyber Attacks, WILSON CTR.: CTRL FORWARD (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
blog-post/the-real-challenges-artificial-intelligence-automating-cyber-attacks; see, e.g., Cade 
Metz & Craig S. Smith, Warnings of a Dark Side to A.I. in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/science/health-medicine-artificial-
intelligence.html (describing the prevalence of adversarial attacks); see also Charlotte A. 
Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health Marketplace, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 
(2017) (describing limitations in the FDA’s review of potential cybersecurity risks). 
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software to create a complete ecosystem.64 Further, additional 
choices must be made for receiving devices, such as how much data 
devices will retain in their local cache, whether limited decisions 
can be made locally and without connectivity to the primary AI 
software, and which data produced by the device should be 
transmitted back to central AI systems.65 In robotics, systems must 
effectively, safely, and reliably operate any number of kinetic 
activities as a robot moves, performs tasks, or interacts with human 
beings using a variety of sensors and actuators.66  
Each of these choices can enhance or reduce effectiveness, 
safety, and reliability. The volume and quality of data collected and 
used for an AI system can dramatically affect the system’s function 
for specific communities and populations.67 Without sufficient data 
volume or representation from different communities, data may 
produce discriminatory or ineffective results. For example, the 
algorithm may have learned from data not representative of a 
specific patient sub-group or economic background, suggesting a 
diagnosis inaccurate for a specific group.68 Training data, on which 
algorithms are developed, may codify discrimination present in the 
data supplied to the system.69 It may also discriminate by proxy, 
 
 64. Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence, 5 
SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 179–85 (2018) (describing the IoT architecture, including big data 
solutions, remote connectivity, and remote AI utility use); see also Chen et al., supra note 44. 
 65. Gretchen Hoffman, Being Smart about Product Design with IoT and AI, 
ALTITUDEINC.COM, https://www.altitudeinc.com/being-smart-about-product-design-with-
iot-and-ai/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). 
 66. See Chen et al., supra note 44, at 3049. 
 67. Bernard Marr, Why AI Would Be Nothing Without Big Data, FORBES (Jun. 9, 2017, 
12:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/06/09/why-ai-would-be-
nothing-without-big-data/; Joshua New, AI Needs Better Data, Not Just More Data, CTR. FOR 
DATA INNOVATION (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/03/ai-needs-
better-data-not-just-more-data/. 
 68. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 91–
94 (2019). Professor Nicholson Price describes AI algorithmic training in high-resource 
contexts, such as university medical centers, and describes the challenge of applying these 
algorithms to environments with lower comparative resources and differing patient 
populations, which could result in less accurate algorithmic decision-making. Id. However, 
other structural limitations not mentioned in Professor Price’s article could also apply to a 
provider’s choice to use such an algorithm. For example, the status of algorithmic use as a 
standard of care for purposes of insurance and avoiding malpractice might reinforce use of 
inaccurate algorithmic decision-making if the algorithm is endorsed due to its use in a 
higher-context environment. 
 69. Paul Teich, Artificial Intelligence Can Reinforce Bias, Cloud Giants Announce Tools for 
AI Fairness, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulteich/
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even when data do not directly identify groups likely to endure 
discrimination.70 
Poorly designed AI software may also be vulnerable to security 
compromise, leading to safety issues.71 Because data from any 
number of sources drive algorithmic function, if data are modified 
in an unauthorized manner, the algorithm itself can function 
incorrectly, giving instructions causing downstream system or 
device malfunction.72 For example, a brain stimulation device’s 
software could be remotely updated or given automated direction 
by an AI algorithm. If the data are changed in an unauthorized 
manner, AI software instructions could increase the electrical 
stimulus beyond its typical thresholds, causing brain damage. 
Similarly, during an availability attack, when data used to direct 
system functions are made unavailable, the system dependent on 
AI might not work, for example in the middle of a surgery assisted 
or completed using surgical robotics. 
In AI diagnostic applications, such as QuantX, the potential for 
cyber-kinetic attacks or poor AI design causing direct physical 
injury may be less likely.73 However, a physician with limited 
cancer knowledge relying on the tool itself may still make an 
inaccurate diagnosis and pursue medical interventions, such as 
radiation or chemotherapy, that could harm an otherwise healthy 




 70. Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and 
Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENVER U.L. REV. 87, 98–100 (2018); see 
generally Daniel Schwarcz & Anya Prince, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2020) (describing the likelihood of 
discrimination when big data and highly powerful AI systems can result in discriminatory 
application of decisions to protected groups). 
 71. See generally Tschider, supra note 64 (raising issues related to security under FDA 
reviews, including lack of specific rules, the superimposition of past models including panel 
reviews, the modulation of device classification through separate component review, and 
failure to review from the position of actual risk with distributed technology architectures). 
Cybersecurity is an essential aspect of good AI, in that poor cybersecurity will likely 
compromise the data feeding algorithms and their subsequent recommendations. 
 72. See Tschider, supra note 70, at 118–20. 
 73. Tutt describes simple mistakes, such as bugs or typos that could result in, for 
example, discriminatory effect. See Tutt, supra note 62, at 106. 
 74. See Jasmine Just, Overdiagnosis: When Finding Cancer Can Do More Harm than Good, 
CANCER RSCH. UK (Mar. 6, 2018), https://scienceblog.cancerresearchuk.org/2018/03/06/
overdiagnosis-when-finding-cancer-can-do-more-harm-than-good/ (describing the role of 
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surgery or AI-enabled updates to implanted or affixed medical 
devices, physical harms are more likely. The impact of any issues, 
including unintentional AI issues, could mean catastrophic injuries 
for patients.75 
Consider, for example, a connected insulin pump like the 
DreaMed Diabetes’ Advisor Pro.76 Advisor Pro, like many AI 
solutions, uses cloud technology, a distributed technology system 
that connects over the open internet,77 making it potentially 
susceptible to cyber-kinetic attacks as well as AI design safety 
issues. Insulin pumps like the Advisor Pro deliver insulin direct to 
the body via a user interface the patient controls, and the interface 
also provides recommendations for insulin delivery to the 
physician.78 If the system tells a patient that the patient’s blood 
sugar is high, it is unlikely that a patient will question whether the 
reading is accurate.79 Although the FDA seems to view the patient 
as quality control, equipped to spot machine failures, automation 
bias and trained incapacity are far more likely to promote a false 
sense of security.80  
 
cancer screening and subsequent treatment for benign cancers as impacting human health); 
Screening: How Overdiagnosis and Other Harms Can Undermine the Benefits, 
HEALTHNEWSREVIEW.ORG, https://www.healthnewsreview.org/screening-how-
overdiagnosis-and-other-harms-can-undermine-the-benefits/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
 75. Olaf J. Groth, Mark J. Nitzberg & Stuart J. Russell, Opinion, AI Algorithms Need 
FDA-Style Drug Trials, WIRED (Aug. 15, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-
algorithms-need-drug-trials/. 
 76. Amanda Pedersen, How AI Is Personalizing Insulin Therapy for Diabetes Patients, 
MED. DEVICE + DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (June 18, 2018), https://www.mddionline.com/how-ai-
personalizing-insulin-therapy-diabetes-patients. 
 77. Advisor Pro, DREAMED, https://dreamed-diabetes.com/advisor/ (last visited 
May 1, 2021). 
 78. Id. 
 79. The FDA has illustrated this view of “human as quality control” via its AI 
diagnostic software approvals. If a physician is providing a diagnosis based on AI, rather 
than automating the diagnosis, usually this software will receive a lower classification. 
However, even professionals may fall victim to automation bias or trained incapacity. 
Trained incapacity results from the regression of humans when they have a tool or 
alternative knowledge that permits them to gain greater efficiency or shift human attention. 
See generally Erin Wais, Trained Incapacity: Thorstein Veblen and Kenneth Burke, 2 J. KENNETH 
BURKE SOC’Y (2005) (quoting THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE 
STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS (1914)), https://www.kbjournal.org/wais. 
 80. Automation bias usually results from reliance on technology, where an individual 
takes less personal responsibility due to their trust and dependence on something other than 
their own judgment. Additionally, over time individuals begin to rely more heavily on 
computers to perform tasks they previously performed. These two conditions 
simultaneously create a situation ripe for injuries to occur. Human interfaces and judgment 
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Diabetes, like cancer, is a key area of focus for much of medical 
device development; the possibility of a bionic pancreas, for 
example, could dramatically change how diabetes patients live. In 
2018, Beta Bionics received an Investigational Device Exception 
(IDE), which is required to clinically test a device on humans, for 
its iLet Bionic Pancreas System, an artificial pancreas powered by 
AI and designed for children and adults living with Type-1 
diabetes.81 Of course, a bionic pancreas by design would function 
with little engagement from the patient at all,82 potentially 
introducing additional safety hazards.  
D. Artificial Intelligence Systems Cannot Be Made Safe by Process-
Based Solutions 
Although the FDA has expressed an interest in AI-enabled 
medical devices, including diagnostic systems and implanted or 
affixed devices, the FDA has not effectively developed any specific 
plan or direction for regulating them.83 It has similarly failed to 
implement specific rules or best practices related to medical device 
cybersecurity. The most concrete of its recent contributions for 
manufacturers was in the form of an AI discussion paper describing 
AI system design and the agency’s new Digital Health Software 
Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, a pilot program for medical 
devices that use AI software.84  
 
do not cure safety issues presented by AI machines. See Cosima Gretton, The Dangers of AI in 
Health Care: Risk Homeostasis and Automation Bias, MEDIUM (June 24, 2017), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/the-dangers-of-ai-in-health-care-risk-homeostasis-and-
automation-bias-148477a9080f. 
 81. Omar Ford, Combining AI and CGM to Make a Bionic Pancreas, MED. DEVICE + 
DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (May 22, 2018), https://www.mddionline.com/combining-ai-and-cgm-
make-bionic-pancreas; Beta Bionics Receives IDE Approval From the FDA to Begin a Home-Use 
Clinical Trial Testing the a New Bionic Pancreas System, DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY, https://drug-
dev.com/beta-bionics-receives-ide-approval-from-the-fda-to-begin-a-home-use-clinical-
trial-testing-the-a-new-bionic-pancreas-system/. 
 82. Press Release, Am. Diabetes Assoc., The iLet Bionic Pancreas Increased Time in 
Range for Adults with Type 1 Diabetes (June 8, 2019), https://www.diabetes.org/
newsroom/press-releases/2019/the-ilet-bionic-pancreas. 
 83. See Jiang et al., supra note 45, at 241. 
 84. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED 
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) 4 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/122535/
download. It should be noted that both of these contributions advance a “hands-off” 
approach to FDA device clearance, rather than increased requirements the FDA will review 
as part of a more comprehensive premarket approval (PMA) process. 
1569 Medical Device Artificial Intelligence 
 1569 
While technical best practices may exist, AI software is typically 
fit for specific uses and designed to be contextually applied, which 
can make recipe-like legal requirements destined to fail.85 
Engineers and data scientists design AI software to fulfill specific 
goals or tasks of a relevant adjacent system with any number of 
rules, and infrastructure design depends on the purpose and use of 
the system.86 For example, AI software that supports medical 
diagnosis will be designed differently, both in system and in 
process, than AI software for self-driving cars, which have very 
different tasks to perform.87 Even when AI infrastructure is used for 
a variety of different AI implementations, the software itself will be 
context-specific to its implementation.  
The FDA appears to have rejected this concept, focusing on 
process-based solutions rather than individual review. The AI 
discussion paper created by the FDA, which was first published for 
feedback in April 2019, describes best practices for machine-
learning enabled diagnostic systems, more specifically for image-
based systems.88 The discussion paper envisions a pre-certification 
process, consistent with the FDA’s pre-certification software 
process launched in January 2019, by which organizations might 
implement a Total Product Life Cycle regulatory approach (TPLC) 
to AI-ML-based software as a medical device.89 In it, the FDA 
 
 85. Training data and system design must be tailored to specific goals or outcomes. 
Without specific goals or outcomes designed in a system, AI systems cannot train or continue 
to improve when performing tasks or rendering specific decisions. 
 86. B.J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence. 
 87. See Daniel Faggella, Machine Learning for Medical Diagnostics—4 Current 
Applications, EMERJ A.I. RSCH. (Mar. 14, 2020), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/
machine-learning-medical-diagnostics-4-current-applications/; Alex Davies, The WIRED 
Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/
guide-self-driving-cars/; Tonya Riley, Get Ready, This Year Your Next Job Interview May Be 
with an A.I. Robot, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/ai-
job-recruiting-tools-offered-by-hirevue-mya-other-start-ups.html. AI utilities are designed 
specifically to fulfill or maximize certain codified goals. For example, medical diagnostics 
might be designed to identify breast cancer from mammogram images, while a self-driving 
car might be designed to identify and follow traffic signals, and an AI employment 
application might be designed to detect false narratives or measure reliability. See generally 
Jim Guszcza, Smarter Together: Why Artificial Intelligence Needs Human-Centered Design, 
DELOITTE REV., January 2018, at 36, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/
us/collections/issue-22/DI_Deloitte-Review-22.pdf. 
 88. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84, at 3–4. 
 89. Id. at 3. The Total Product Life Cycle Regulatory approach is a model wherein 
organizations implement process-based solutions, such as testing procedures, requirements 
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proposes a similar type of approach to its existing model for quality 
process facility inspection, where the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) visits and inspects facilities planned for manufacturing a 
specific device.90  
The TPLC maps well onto the facility inspection portion of 
existing FDA approval, which includes both a review of the design 
of the device itself (including associated clinical trial results and 
proposed labeling) and a review of the facility and quality system 
processes for producing it.91 Although the TPLC should improve 
the overall safety profile for some AI software, the process will not 
effectively support a detailed, use-specific device design review.92  
A singular model for premarket review cannot provide 
direction for other medical devices or even for different types of 
diagnostic systems, simply because the methods used to create safe 
and reliable diagnostic imaging systems would not necessarily be 
effective for other systems.93 In short, process-based models are 
part of, rather than a comprehensive solution for, effective FDA 
review. For example, diagnostic software for colon cancer using 
medical chart data might be designed differently than diagnostic 
software using mammogram images for breast cancer.94 Depending 
 
development, and AI modeling. Id. at 4. In this approach, administrative agencies like the 
FDA can regulate the organization’s practices rather than specific products. Id. 
 90. The facility inspection process, conducted by a third party or the FDA, assesses the 
quality system implemented in the manufacturing facility for higher risk medical devices 
and reviews proposed compliance with appropriate requirements from a manufacturing 
perspective. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDE TO INSPECTIONS OF QUALITY SYSTEMS 
(1999), https://www.fda.gov/files/Guide-to-Inspections-of-Quality-Systems.pdf; U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ACCREDITED PERSONS INSPECTION PROGRAM (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/third-party-inspection-devices/accredited-
persons-inspection-program. These programs adhere to Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMP), general established practices that are reviewed in addition to specific quality process 
requirements for the device being manufactured. 
 91. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84, at 8–9. The TPLC even uses a 
surrogate for GMP, Good Machine Learning Practices (GMLP), to echo the standardization 
of GMP. Id. at 9. It should be noted, however, that even GMP require special adaptation to 
the device being manufactured in a traditional facility. This makes intuitive sense: a 
pacemaker might require different processes for quality enforcement of specific leads used 
to stimulate the heart than the port for an insulin pump. 
 92. Id. at 8–9. 
 93. See Copeland, supra note 86; Charles Aunger, Should the FDA Regulate AI?, FORBES 
(Aug. 14, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/08/14/
should-the-fda-regulate-al/. 
 94. Different AI techniques can provide different results with the same goals and 
application, let alone different goals. See Guy Nir, Davood Karimi, S. Larry Goldenberg, 
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on the target population and relative frequency of a disease’s 
occurrence or variability, the system might also be designed 
differently to ensure a high level of reliability.95 Although the TPLC 
might be tremendously useful as a starting point for machine 
learning diagnostic software, the variables selected by data 
scientists in creating any AI system, as well as the system’s interface 
and direction of physical devices, are highly specific to the device 
and population at hand. This inherent “fit-for-purpose,” or 
customized nature of software design, especially for AI, does not 
lend itself well to a broad, manufacturer-level certification process 
as the primary model for safety and efficacy. 
Although industry best practices might inform system design, 
they also cannot completely prevent algorithmic discrimination, 
privacy, or safety issues specific to the AI software’s 
implementation, as designed. AI algorithms might integrate certain 
principles, but they necessarily must be designed, tested, and 
continuously monitored for their specific purposes and codified 
goals. Algorithmic outputs are typically personalized with respect 
to the user and change dynamically, unless it is “locked,” or 
rendered non-learning, at the time of FDA submission, which 
dramatically reduces its potential efficacy.96  
The customized aspect of AI combined with its dynamic 
inscrutability for unlocked algorithms poses unique challenges for 
 
Ladan Fazli, Brian F. Skinnider, Peyman Tavassoli, Dmitry Turbin, Carlos F. Villamil, Gang 
Wang, Darby J.S. Thompson, Peter C. Black & Septimiu E. Salcudean, Comparison of Artificial 
Intelligence Techniques to Evaluate Performance of a Classifier for Automatic Grading of Prostate 
Cancer from Digitized Histopathologic Images, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 2–4 (2019), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2727273. In Nir et al.’s 
comparative analysis, prostate cancer benefitted from certain patient CV models and multi-
expert data rather than histopathologic images (a digitized camera image from a microscope 
of cancer cells). Id. at 8. 
 95. W. Nicholson Price’s arguments related to high-context and low-context 
environments is particularly salient here, as systems are not easily transferrable from one 
population to another. See Price, supra note 68. This is precisely why the FDA requires specific 
labeling that adheres to the test populations from clinical trials in traditional medical device 
approvals, and while it permits off-label use, off-label use cannot be promoted by medical 
device manufacturers, and physicians are not protected from medical malpractice related to 
off-label use, unless off-label use reflects the standard of care. See Christopher M. Wittich, 
Christopher M. Burkle & William L. Lanier, Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) About 
Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 986–87 (2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538391/pdf/main.pdf. 
 96. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84, at 3 n.7; Jiang et al., supra note 45, at 
241. The most effective algorithms require updated data be supplied so that the algorithm is 
able to learn from a greater variety of data inputs. Id. This renders algorithms static versus 
dynamic.  
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effective preventative oversight,97 as what is a perfectly reasonable 
design for one AI software application may not appropriately 
acknowledge issues for another.98 With AI, potential risks can only 
be anticipated to a limited extent because the algorithm making the 
decisions is a completely different algorithm in clinical trials than 
when used post-trial.99 The world is a clinical trial for health AI, full 
of unanticipated issues unlikely to arise in a limited clinical-trial 
scheme and difficult to anticipate at the time of FDA submission.100 
Countless human decisions result in automated decision-
making via AI algorithms, including those powering low-risk and 
high-risk applications, from diagnostic software to surgical 
robotics. The depth of human ingenuity paired with machine 
computer power and longitudinal extensibility will revolutionize 
life as we know it. While the risks are high, the incentives and 
potential outcomes are similarly high. The most crucial step is 
finding the appropriate balance for incentivizing development 
 
 97. Aunger, supra note 93. 
 98. For example, many training data sets might contain information that is more or 
less useful for specific uses and may result in less useful functionality. See Drew Roselli, 
Jeanna Matthews & Nisha Talagala, Managing Bias in AI, COMPANION PROC. 2019 WORLD 
WIDE WEB CONF., May 2019, at 539, https://people.clarkson.edu/~jmatthew/publications/
ManagingBiasInAI_CAMERAREADY.pdf. 
 99. The FDA has focused on developing an acceptable framework for adapting clinical 
trials for AI machines, including two formal guidance documents. U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., ADAPTIVE DESIGNS FOR MEDICAL DEVICE CLINICAL STUDIES (2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/adaptive-
designs-medical-device-clinical-studies; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF REAL-WORLD 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/use-real-
world-evidence-support-regulatory-decision-making-medical-devices; U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICE DEVELOPMENT TOOLS (MDDT) (2021), https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/science-and-research-medical-devices/medical-device-development-
tools-mddt. These, respectively, permit broader indications for use based on accumulated 
information after the trial phases are over to bolster clinical trial data and the ability to alter 
the clinical trial to some extent based on pre-planned and expected deviations. These 
guidance documents do signal that the FDA understands, at least facially, the development 
of AI technologies. However, they do not address design-specific issues. 
 100. The model of “the world as a clinical trial” is a common model for medical 
products that would prove too expensive to fully test in a clinical trial environment, such as 
vaccines. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 453 (2010). The FDA has also 
embarked on useful efforts to better gather and use data for purposes of improving device 
functionality. One example of this effort is the NEST platform, which “generate[s] evidence 
across the total product lifecycle of medical devices.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NATIONAL 
EVALUATION SYSTEM FOR HEALTH TECHNOLOGY (NEST) (2019), https://www.fda.gov/
about-fda/cdrh-reports/national-evaluation-system-health-technology-nest. These types of 
platforms will be indispensable for AI machines. 
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while reducing potential issues. Where preventative regulation is 
undesirable or unlikely to provide safe and effective medical 
devices, the tort system may provide a complementary opportunity 
to reinforce safety while providing injury compensation. 
II. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION AND TORT PREEMPTION 
The medical device preemption trilogy of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 
(1996), Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (2001), and Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc. (2008) dramatically reduced the probability of 
plaintiffs successfully recovering in tort for injuries caused by 
medical device use.101 In total, the preemption trilogy has nearly 
foreclosed any opportunity for patient recovery when medical 
devices have undergone a complete FDA review, with only a 
narrow opportunity to successfully bring a tort claim that survives 
summary judgment.102  
A. The Medical Devices Amendments Act of 1976 and Subsequent 
Preemption Cases Have Nearly Foreclosed Tort Recovery 
In response to widespread and well-publicized pharmaceutical 
and medical device injuries, John F. Kennedy championed passage 
of two amendments that would focus on more comprehensive 
regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical devices—the Drug 
Amendments of 1962 and a medical device-focused amendment.103 
However, the thalidomide disaster, where a pharmaceutical used 
for morning sickness resulted in serious birth defects for more than 
10,000 children, prompted Congress to prioritize passing the Drug 
Amendments of 1962.104  
In 1976, Congress finally passed the Medical Device 
Amendments (MDA) against a backdrop of catastrophic Dalkon 
 
 101. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2007). 
 102. The Author focuses on the potential for a plaintiff to bring a tort action that 
survives preemption. However, this Article does not address a variety of other medical 
device tort complexities, such as heightened pleadings standards combined with the inability 
to produce highly specific claims due to confidentiality commitments between the Food and 
Drug Administration and manufacturers. 
 103. INST. OF MED., PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION 4 (Theresa Wizemann ed., 2010), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/12960/chapter/1#ii. 
 104. Id.; Thalidomide, SCI. MUSEUM (Dec. 11, 2019), http://broughttolife. 
sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/themes/controversies/thalidomide. 
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Shield injuries, where an intrauterine device used by 2.2 million 
women caused pelvic infection, infertility, and death.105 At the time, 
although Congress was aiming to provide greater protection for 
medical device consumers,106 Congress could not have anticipated 
the potential challenges of regulating the diverse and fast-growing 
medical device industry.107  
The MDA established a PMA process for medical devices,108 a 
substantial process involving a “multivolume application.”109 As 
part of this act, Congress statutorily integrated a risk management 
model into its ambits, based on a classification system of Class I, 
Class II, and Class III (from lowest to highest risk).110 Additionally, 
Congress charged the FDA to determine the safety and efficacy of 
a device “weighing any probable benefit to health . . . against any 
probable risk of injury or illness from . . . use.”111 This combined 
approach illustrated that medical device safety and efficacy review 
should take into account both potential risk to individuals using 
such devices and (1) actual device users, (2) recommended or 
suggested labeling, (3) cost and benefit analysis, and (4) device 
reliability.112  
The preemption provision that accompanied the tiering system 
made sense from the perspective of a fully regulating central 
agency, if Congress believed that the FDA would have the 
appropriate resources to fully regulate safety and efficacy for the 
 
 105. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); CDC, Elevated Risk of Pelvic 
Inflammatory Disease Among Women Using the Dalkon Shield, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. (May 06, 1983), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000072.htm. 
 106. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Because the MDA did not, on its 
own, provide a compensatory remedy, it is hard to believe that the MDA was intended to 
preempt state torts quickly following a high-profile tragedy. Id. 
 107. Jeffrey K. Shapiro, The Medical Device Amendments of 1976: The Statute that Went 
Awry, FDA L. BLOG (June 3, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2013/06/the-medical-
device-amendments-of-1976-the-statute-that-went-awry/; see MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 219. 
 108. Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”), Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360c). 
 109. See Riegel, 522 U.S. at 317–18. 
 110. Id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE CLASSIFICATION PANELS (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-device/device-
classification-panels. Practically speaking, classifications are proposed by the applicant for a 
particular medical device based on definitions for specific families of devices in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) and predicate devices previously approved. Each classification 
integrates general controls further illustrated in the CFR for all devices, with special controls 
offered for Class II and Class III devices, respectively. 
 111. Medical Device Amendments § 513(a)(2)(C). 
 112. Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2020). 
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medical device sector. They could not have anticipated that the U.S. 
medical device sector would grow to become one of the biggest 
industries in healthcare, with 7,000 medical device companies 
accounting for some $136 billion in annual sales as of 2015, or 45% 
of the global medical device market.113 
In addition to establishing the classification system and the 
PMA and abbreviated 510(k) processes for medical device 
clearance, Congress also included a limited preemption clause in 
the MDA.114 Under the MDA preemption clause, plaintiffs may not 
recover for injuries resulting from a “requirement . . . which is 
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under 
[the MDA], and . . . which relates to the safety or effectiveness of 
the device.”115 
This preemption clause seemed, at its passage, to embrace the 
role of the FDA as primary regulator for the medical device 
industry by barring state laws that establish different or additional 
state requirements beyond federal requirements.116 The operative 
function of this preemption clause, then, was to dismiss patient 
claims, usually as a negligence or negligence per se tort, claiming 
injury related to non-compliance with state law.117 However, at the 
time of passage, Congress could not have anticipated how 
preemption law under the MDA would develop.  
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) was the first case to fully address 
preemption related to FDA regulation of medical devices. In Lohr, 
the Supreme Court established an initial skeleton of how the MDA 
preempted state tort actions.118 First, the Court established that 
preemption would only apply where the FDA had completed a 
detailed review a given device, specifically through the PMA 
process generally used for new Class III devices.119 Practically 
 
 113. Sarah Collins, A Must-Read Overview of the Medical Device Industry, MKT. REALIST 
(Nov. 19, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://marketrealist.com/2015/11/must-read-overview-
medical-device-industry/. 
 114. See text accompanying notes 108–109. 
 115. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 116. Much has been written on the meaning of preemption within the MDA, both for 
explicit and implied preemption. This Article does not attempt to reopen this discussion 
specifically, but rather to work within established case law to explain how AI might present 
specific challenges related to the Court’s interpretation of the MDA preemption language. 
 117. State laws consist of statutory obligations specifically codified and common law-
established duties. 
 118. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492 (1996). 
 119. Id. at 494. 
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speaking, this meant that plaintiffs seeking recovery for device 
injuries reviewed in abbreviated processes could survive express 
preemption by the MDA.120 Abbreviated processes include the 
510(k) process for substantially equivalent (SE) devices, other 
abbreviated reviews, and lower-risk classification reviews (Class II 
and Class I, which include the 510(k) process and exempted status, 
respectively).121 This interpretation of the MDA reinforced the 
balance between investment in comprehensive ex ante regulatory 
approval and recovery for less comprehensive premarket 
processes.  
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008) expanded PMA-informed 
preemption to additional tort actions. Until Riegel, courts typically 
found tort recovery preempted where a statute established 
additional or different requirements from FDA requirements 
promulgated as part of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In 
Riegel, the Court expanded preemption application from positive 
state law to include common law tort actions.122 The cumulative 
effect of this interpretation is that where the FDA has established 
overt requirements and reviewed compliance with these 
requirements via the PMA process, all tort actions are preempted 
except where the tort action parallels the FDA requirement, insofar 
that they are not different or additional requirements.123 
Riegel established that most common law claims stemming from 
PMA-reviewed medical devices could not survive preemption. 
First, the PMA approval process had to have established 
requirements of “safety and effectiveness” under the MDA because 
the FDA cannot approve devices that do not meet reasonable safety 
and effectiveness standards.124 Second, because common law tort 
actions in part determine “reasonable” duties with respect to 
products, a jury could establish additional or different 
requirements than the FDA has established.125 However, common 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(3) (2020); Suzanne Hodsden, FDA Releases List of Class I 
Medical Devices Exempt from 510(k) Notifications, MED DEVICE ONLINE (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/fda-releases-list-of-class-i-medical-devices-
exempt-from-k-notifications-0001. 
 122. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). 
 123. In this way, Lohr introduced the possibility of parallel claims and Riegel 
subsequently established recovery in these circumstances. 
 124. Jarret Sena, The Contours of the Parallel Claim Exception: The Supreme Court’s 
Opportunity to Define the Ill-Defined, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 291, 304 (2014). 
 125. Id. 
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law claims that parallel federal requirements could survive 
preemption because they are not different or additional 
requirements: they are the same requirements.126 Parallel claims, or 
claims for recovery premised on violation of federal requirements, 
may survive preemption under both Lohr and Riegel.127 
Parallel claims may still be preempted under an implied 
preemption model.128 Under implied preemption, preemption may 
still apply even when language does not specifically determine 
preemption, such as when such an activity does not occupy a “field 
which the states have traditionally occupied.”129 In Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (2001), the Court found implied 
preemption when a consultant for Buckman may have 
misrepresented information to the FDA amounting to fraud.130 The 
Court reasoned that the burden on manufacturers of exposure to 
potential liability would become a disincentive for greater 
competition and “delay the prescription of beneficial off-label 
uses.”131 Lohr, Riegel, and Buckman collectively recognize an express 
and implied preemption for devices approved via the PMA 
process, with a narrow exception for parallel claims to federal 
requirements.132 
If only such federal requirements were sufficiently clear and 
specific. As a threshold issue, it is unclear what is considered a 
“genuinely equivalent” claim to a federal requirement.133 
Moreover, it is unknown what even constitutes a “requirement.” 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494–95 (1996); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 128. Parallel claims may or may not be supported for recovery. Lohr and Riegel likely 
created space for such a claim, but claims related to failure to warn or labeling may not 
succeed under implied preemption. Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th 
Cir. 2017). 
 129. Sena, supra note 124, at 306 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947)). 
 130. The Court held that activities like preventing fraud were principally within the 
responsibilities of the FDA, rather than traditional state responsibilities. See Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001). 
 131. Sena, supra note 124, at 307. 
 132. See id. at 323–24 (examining Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769 (D. Minn. 
2009)). Preemption follows from a two-step framework: (1) the government has established 
requirements for the specific device at issue, and (2) whether the claims are based on 
requirements different from or in addition to these federal requirements. See Shuker v. 
Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 133. Sena, supra note 124, at 308–11 (quoting McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 
489 (7th Cir. 2005)). The Seventh Circuit has held that genuine equivalence applies to the 
medical device context. Id. at 310. 
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The MDA references the requirement as “any requirement 
applicable under [the MDA] to the device” or “which relates to the 
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included 
in requirement applicable to the device under th[e] Act.”134 Where 
there is not “sufficient information to establish a performance 
standard . . . to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and 
effectiveness, the Secretary may conduct such activities . . . to 
develop or obtain such information.”135  
If medical device preemption were not already imprecise, a 
recent circuit court decision has complicated it further, specifically 
for component devices subject to modulated review.136 In Shuker v. 
Smith & Nephew, PLC (2018), the Third Circuit examined whether 
components that were reviewed as separate classifications but 
integrated into one device would survive preemption, which 
requires courts to apply the “presumption against the pre-emption 
[sic] of state police power regulations.”137 In Shuker, a component 
was approved for a specific hip resurfacing system via the PMA 
process set out in 510(k), but the plaintiff’s doctor used the 
component off-label for a total hip replacement.138 The plaintiff 
argued that claims related to the PMA component should not be 
preempted because of the device’s component status within a 
510(k)-reviewed system. However, according to the Third Circuit, 
the use of the PMA component for off-label use essentially divorced 
the component from the system, as the FDA identifies each 
component as a separate device.139  
Next, the Third Circuit applied the two-step test and found that 
Riegel did not sufficiently explain how to examine mixed-class 
components within a device.140 Under an argument of PMA 
adherence, wherein any component of a 510(k)-approved device 
inherits PMA status, the court ultimately held that each component, 
 
 134. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). 
 135. Id. It should be noted that this section directly follows the section on classification, 
which means that this interpretation of performance standards applies regardless of 
classification. 
 136. At the time of writing, only the Third Circuit had considered this question, but the 
expected reliance of device companies on third parties creating software, including AI, could 
result in substantially more component-based preemption inquiries. 
 137. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 770–71 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 
(1992)). 
 138. Id. at 769. 
 139. Id. at 772–73. 
 140. Id. at 774. 
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including the component of the device that caused Mr. Shuker’s 
injury, was subject to PMA approval.141 Ultimately, claims related 
to the PMA-reviewed component were preempted.142 Although 
district courts have not completely deviated from the Third 
Circuit’s analysis,143 the potential for “preemption by adherence,” 
regardless of actual FDA review, is very troubling when 
considering the potential for AI injuries. For example, courts have 
yet to decide whether claims involving a PMA-approved system 
with a 510(k) component are preempted. If the component is 
responsible for injury, such as a defective AI software component, 
but the system nevertheless was approved under a PMA, it is 
unclear whether the component would inherit PMA status and tort 
claims would be preempted or whether the component could be 
analyzed independently.  
AI software will likely be one component of physical medical 
devices, potentially medical devices that are implanted or 
otherwise could cause injury to the human body. However, the AI 
software may be reviewed and approved as a separate component 
from the physical medical device, and in some cases the AI may be 
created by a third party, not a device manufacturer.144 While the 
PMA process has, in most cases, almost fully preempted potential 
recovery from PMA-cleared devices, the PMA process may extend 
to injuries caused by components that nevertheless were not subject 
to PMA review.  
Except for cases involving injuries related to separately 
classified component devices, Lohr, Buckman, and Riegel have 
collectively established the following precedent for a tort claim to 
 
 141. Id. at 773–74. 
 142. Id. at 775. 
 143. See, e.g., LaFountain v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 14cv1598 (WWE), 2016 WL 
3919796 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016). In LaFountain, multiple components of a hip replacement 
system caused injury, and although some components were PMA-approved, the overall 
system alleged to have injured LaFountain was not PMA-approved. The claims were alleged 
to parallel federal requirements. In this case, the District of Connecticut court looked, as the 
Third Circuit did, to the classification of the system, though the District also made explicit 
the relationship between what caused the injury (e.g., the system, rather than a specific 
component) to make this determination. 
 144. In the Author’s recent work with start-up medical device manufacturers, these 
organizations have shared that they frequently use third-party AI software. Although not 
dispositive, the practice is not rare. 
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survive summary judgment when a PMA or similarly stringent 
FDA review process is used145:  
1. Does the tort claimant aim to recover on the basis of 
different or additional state requirements (including general 
tort duties determined by a jury) beyond federal or FDA 
requirements? 
2. For claims that allege a state-law requirement parallel to an 
FDA-established requirement, is the requirement sufficiently 
specific? 
3. Is the state-law requirement mandatory or compulsory in 
nature? 
4. If a state-law claim is mandatory, sufficiently specific, and 
parallel to federal requirement, is it still within the traditional 
boundaries of what a state should regulate? 
The cumulative effect of these cases is to almost completely 
preempt tort actions when the FDA has used a PMA or similarly 
stringent approval process for medical device clearance. Of course, 
this preemption model will likely prevent recovery for AI-enabled 
medical devices that are cleared through PMA or similarly 
stringent approval processes, regardless of whether the FDA has in 
fact reviewed the AI system running the medical device. 
B. The Comprehensive Premarket Approval Process and Requirements 
Are Not Designed for AI Devices 
The FDA has used a variety of resources to provide direction to 
manufacturers offering medical devices for sale in the United 
States.146 Organizations are traditionally responsible for proposing 
a specific classification for a new device.147 Organizations 
proposing Class III devices (and other devices that cannot 
 
 145. It should be noted that these cases do firmly establish that when a non-
comprehensive review process is used, such as the 510(k) process, tort actions may go 
forward. Buckman was determined via implied preemption analysis but nevertheless 
demonstrates the Court’s willingness to expand preemption beyond its express bounds. See 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001). 
 146. It should be noted that the definition of “medical device” is quite broad, including 
potentially any health device, although the FDA may use its discretionary authority to not 
review some medical devices, such as Class I health apps and other software. See U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., HOW TO DETERMINE IF YOUR PRODUCT IS A MEDICAL DEVICE (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-device/product-medical-
device. 
 147. See 21 C.F.R. § 860 (2020). 
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demonstrate Class I- or Class II-appropriate classification) must not 
only successfully receive approval via the PMA process, but 
manufacturing facilities must also meet quality management 
standards.148 Manufacturers planning for the PMA process must 
also meet pre-clinical trial requirements, including device design, 
bench testing, and animal testing prior to a clinical trial.149  
Clinical trial requirements for an IDE,150 the first step for PMA 
approval, usually includes, inter alia, a two-trial approach to 
determine feasibility followed by a clinical trial testing safety and 
efficacy, or a pivotal study, for a patient population.151 Within the 
PMA process, organizations must submit evidence of safety and 
efficacy via scientific evidence, including a well-controlled clinical 
investigation consisting of one or more trials, that includes a clear 
statement of study objectives, a method for subject selection, 
methods explanation, and articulation and comparison of results 
using reliable statistical methods.152  
The PMA application, which includes both clinical results and 
labeling details, is reviewed by panels of FDA-employed experts, 
who are assembled within a panel designation as part of the 
Medical Devices Advisory Committee, which has eighteen 
panels.153 These panels typically include experts in the principal 
device’s primary scientific field; for example, the Circulatory 
Systems Devices Panel consists of four cardiologists and one expert 
in regulatory affairs.154  
 
 148. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 808, 812, 820 (2020). Manufacturing facilities must meet Current 
Good Manufacturing Processes (CGMP) through an effective quality control system. It 
should be noted that these inspections do not include virtual or technical infrastructure 
reviews, wherein code might be reviewed; instead, CGMPs usually include sanitary and 
repeatable quality facility operation checks. 
 149. Owen Faris, Clinical Trials for Medical Devices: FDA and the IDE Process, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/87603/download (last visited Mar. 5, 2021). 
 150. See 21 C.F.R. § 812 (2019). 
 151. See Faris, supra note 149. 
 152. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PMA CLINICAL STUDIES (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-clinical-studies. 
 153. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 110; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
MEDICAL DEVICES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2019) [hereinafter FDA, MED. DEVICES ADVISORY 
COMM.], https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/medical-devices/medical-devices-
advisory-committee. 
 154. Roster of the Circulatory System Devices Panel, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/circulatory-system-devices-panel/roster-
circulatory-system-devices-panel. 
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Classification typically flows from predicate devices within a 
panel’s statutory classification scheme. For example, portions of a 
pacemaker will likely be classified under the Circulatory Systems 
Devices Panel, with a similar classification to previously approved 
devices.155 A pacemaker programmer, a hand-held device that 
non-invasively makes software changes to an implanted 
pacemaker within a short physical distance from the 
pacemaker, will typically be classified as a Class III medical 
device and required to meet PMA requirements.156 Each device 
type typically must follow requirements communicated in the 
CFR and specific requirements the FDA analyst and panel 
identifies in reviewing the PMA file. The challenge, of course, 
is that a panel of radiologists may not be experts in AI 
software or even general software design, and requirements in 
the CFR usually are not specific enough to guarantee software 
quality.157 
However, classification and associated review can be 
modulated, whereby certain portions of a device, such as the 
software running a device, can be reviewed using different 
classification standards that require less restrictive attendant 
controls.158 For example, a physical pacemaker that is “new” for 
purposes of review would likely be a Class III device requiring the 
PMA process. However, if classified as separate modules, the 
software running on the pacemaker would likely be a Class II 
device not requiring the PMA process.159 When software is integral 
to a medical device’s operation yet is reviewed in an isolated 
 
 155. 21 C.F.R. § 870 (2020). 
 156. 21 C.F.R. § 870.3700 (2020). 
 157. See infra Section II.C and accompanying notes. 
 158. Although Class II and Class III devices would both require special controls, a PMA 
process review, through the FDA’s inquiry, would likely be more restrictive than the 510(k) 
process in that the FDA and associated expert panels might ask questions to better 
understand how manufactures have met special controls in this precise case. 
 159. Different component classifications could increase risks to patients when lower 
classification components are implemented into a higher classification system. See Bill 
Siwicki, Next-Gen Medical Devices: Security, AI, Rethinking Design for Patient Experience, 
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (June 19, 2018), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/next-gen-
medical-devices-security-ai-rethinking-design-patient-experience (describing the potential 
for AI-driven device failure and the need for holistic device review). Logically, if a Class II 
component inherits the preemptive power of the primary Class I device, injuries are both (1) 
not prevented through comprehensive review and (2) preempted from tort recovery. 
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manner, modulation in the review process likely prevents a holistic 
safety review and preempts a comprehensive risk analysis.160  
If the FDA was implementing a regulatory model that 
anticipated patient risks associated with software and its 
interaction with physical devices, such as AI-enabled device 
systems, a modulated approach might not fully anticipate potential 
risks. For example, an AI-enabled surgical robot might cause a 
patient injury, not just because of the robot itself, but because of the 
AI instructing the robot’s surgical moves. In this case, AI software 
might have been reviewed in the 510(k) truncated process, while 
the surgical robot and its basic local software was reviewed via the 
PMA process. Therefore, the AI software may have received a less 
stringent FDA review. However, because the robot received a PMA 
review, and the AI software is part of the broader robotics system, 
the entire system may be viewed from the preemption perspective 
as having received a PMA review.161 
Moreover, the PMA process is not, however, intended to be the 
end of the process, at least for devices that are modified after PMA 
clearance. A PMA supplement or PMA amendment must be 
created when the device subject to the PMA process has 
significantly changed from the material submitted in the PMA 
submission. The PMA amendment is used when a change is needed 
for a submitted, but not yet approved, PMA file.162 The PMA 
supplement is used when the device has significantly changed or 
the change affects the safety and efficacy of the device.163 Under 
some circumstances, manufacturers may be required to resubmit a 
PMA rather than as supplement, such as when changes to the 
device might raise different types of safety or effectiveness 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 21 C.F.R. § 814.37 (2020). 
 163. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PMA SUPPLEMENTS AND AMENDMENTS (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-supplements-and-
amendments. These supplements may be specific to another indication for use, for significant 
change to performance, changes in components or materials, changes in design, or changes 
in labeling, amongst others. Some supplements are “real time,” or supplements for minor 
changes. From a practical perspective, dynamically inscrutable AI software will not likely be 
a good candidate for this kind of administrative process because it is constantly evolving. 
Manufacturers would likely need to continuously fill out paperwork to stay current, leading 
to administrative nightmares. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1584 
questions or where there are no accepted test methods for 
evaluating these new questions.164 
The PMA process is somewhat comprehensive for what it 
regulates, yet there are serious gaps, especially for AI-enabled 
medical devices. These systems have the potential to create safety 
hazards for patients but likely leave patients without any 
opportunity for recovery in tort. Medical devices under PMA 
review are often reviewed by experts, but not necessarily experts in 
AI or software development; components of a medical device, 
which are nevertheless incorporated into the final product, may not 
receive a Class III classification or PMA review although they may 
introduce new safety hazards.165 AI-enabled devices will usually 
function differently than at their approval. But as a foundational 
question, it is unclear which FDA instructions actually constitute a 
“requirement” for purposes of the PMA process. The lack of clear 
requirements and a reliance on non-binding “guidelines” or 
“guidance” may create substantial downstream issues for tort 
recovery. 
C. The MDA Preemption Term “Requirement” Is Imprecise 
Organizations must use FDA documents to guide the 
development of products that will meet panel expectations, such as 
requirements, regulations, and guidelines, or guidance.166 
However, the term “requirement” is not as clear as might be 
expected on its face. The FDA describes “regulatory requirements” 
as including establishment registration, where manufacturing 
facilities must be registered, medical device listing, premarket 
notification or PMA processes, the IDE process for clinical trials, 
quality system regulations, labeling requirements, and ongoing 
issue reporting.167  
Within the CFR sections specific to FDA processes, the term 
“requirements” is used typically in relation to specific information 
provided as part of the PMA process, such as details to be included 
in clinical trial results, although some specific regulatory 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. See infra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
 166. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PMA REVIEW PROCESS (2019), https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-review-process. 
 167. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF DEVICE REGULATION (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-
assistance/overview-device-regulation; 21 C.F.R §§ 801, 803, 807, 812, 814, 820 (2020). 
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requirements have been promulgated via the CFR.168 For example, 
coronary vascular physiologic simulation (CVPS) software visually 
simulates blood flow using data extracted from an coronary 
imaging device.169 The results of such simulation software might 
inform whether a patient requires medical treatment, such as 
surgery or medication, to treat a coronary blood-flow issue that 
increases a patient’s risk of a heart attack or stroke. This type of 
software requires, according to the CFR, “verification and 
validation based on comprehensive hazard analysis,” which 
includes “any proprietary algorithm(s) used to model the vascular 
anatomy.”170 The same provision of the CFR also requires 
“adequate consideration of privacy and security issues in 
[software’s] system design.”171 
It is clear from the CFR “requirements,” the closest 
approximation of which are special controls, that manufacturers 
have discretion in how risks related to algorithm reliability and 
other data integrity issues might be mitigated. In this example, a 
manufacturer may rely on published yet nonbinding FDA 
guidance to interpret how to meet CFR special controls, or they 
may not. As guidance documents are non-binding, it is unclear 
whether such documents could form the basis for a “requirement” 
under the MDA even if they are integrated into PMA review by the 
FDA analyst or panel. 
D. Guidance Enhances Regulatory Requirement Breadth and Depth but 
Does Not Address AI Concerns 
Although regulatory requirements provide some direction in 
terms of system design for a software product like CVPS software, 
additional guidance is provided via other FDA documents.172 It is 
 
 168. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (2020). The term “requirements” is used throughout the 
CFR in a variety of different contexts. Additional, device-specific regulatory requirements 
are codified in 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 for medical devices. 
 169. 21 C.F.R. § 870.1415 (2020). 
 170. Id. The CFR continues, “Data must be provided within the clinical validation study 
or using equivalent datasets demonstrating the consistency of the output that is 
representative of the range of data quality likely to be encountered in the intended use 
population and relevant use conditions in the intended use environment.” Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Although guidance documents are not legally binding, they often elucidate more 
specificity for a regulatory requirement. For example, “adequate security and privacy” might 
be appropriately implemented using premarket security guidance and used as the basis for 
meeting this regulatory requirement in the PMA process. 
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unclear whether and to what extent guidance documents are used 
in the PMA approval process as binding requirements.173 The FDA, 
for its part, has contextualized guidance as “not creat[ing] or 
confer[ring] rights for or on any person . . .[,] not operat[ing] to bind 
FDA or the public,” and offering the possibility for alternative 
means to meet the underlying regulatory requirement.174  
However, it is generally accepted that guidance operates, at 
least for PMA reviews, as a pseudo-requirement. Specifically, FDA 
personnel, for example the analyst assigned to the file, usually 
evaluate compliance with a special control, such as “[a]dequate 
consideration of privacy and security issues” through the lens of 
guidance documents.175 In this way, guidance seems to operate, at 
least for some types of reviews, as a rebuttable presumption: so 
long as organizations demonstrably meet the guidance, they also 
demonstrate compliance with associated special controls. If the 
organization does not meet the guidance, they must provide 
documentation to demonstrate that they still comply with the 
special control. To what degree FDA personnel or panel members 
actually provide expert direction in this review process is 
unknown, though facially it seems unlikely that personnel and 
panel members are equipped to review software design and 
anticipate real patient risks for new software technology like AI 
from a position of deep expertise.  
For software-enabled medical devices, guidance documents 
consist of software-specific documents and cybersecurity 
documents, with the potential for future artificial intelligence 
documents, amongst many planned software and cybersecurity-
related documents.176 Despite the plethora of different software 
 
 173. 21 C.F.R. § 870.1415. 
 174. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (MEDICAL DEVICES AND 
RADIATION-EMITTING PRODUCTS) (2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-
advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/guidance-documents-medical-devices-and-
radiation-emitting-products. 
 175. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.1415(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES (2016) [hereinafter FDA, 
POSTMARKET], https://www.fda.gov/media/95862/download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): CLINICAL EVALUATION (2017), [hereinafter FDA, 
SAMD] https://www.fda.gov/media/100714/download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL 
DEVICES (2018) [hereinafter FDA, PREMARKET], https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-
information/search-fda-guidance-documents/content-premarket-submissions-
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guidance documents, software bugs and security vulnerabilities 
continue to plague medical devices.177  
The FDA has not developed many guidance documents related 
to AI or algorithms specifically, though it has developed general 
guidance for software.178 It is unknown, however, to what degree 
guidance actually informs specific PMA decisions, and the extent 
of software or similar review, when panel members may be experts 
in the physical device, but not the software or other computerized 
technology that run it.179 Of course, modulated reviews may not 
provide any direct PMA review for portions of a full device, 
although the device, as operating, may pose patient risks. 
Given these challenges in control review, personnel and panel 
expertise, and modulated reviews, it is no surprise that the FDA has 
taken a predominantly responsive rather than proactive approach 
for new technologies, first relying on postmarket guidance rather 
than PMA review.180 When this approach has become more 
 
management-cybersecurity-medical-devices. AI has not received the direct attention of 
software and cybersecurity, although the recent whitepaper is illustrating an interest in the 
subject. Additional interest has revived for software validation, prompting a 2019 goal for 
new final guidance on Changes to Existing Medical Software Policies Resulting from Section 3060 
of the 21st Century Cures Act and Clinical and Patient Decision Support Software. See U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., CDRH FISCAL YEAR 2019 PROPOSED GUIDANCE DEVELOPMENT AND 
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW (2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/cdrh-fy-
2019-proposed-guidance-development-and-retrospective-review. Planned draft guidance 
includes Computer Systems Assurance for Manufacturing, Operations, and Quality System 
Software; Content of Premarket Submissions for Cybersecurity of Medical Devices of Moderate and 
Major Level of Concern; and Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software 
Contained in Medical Devices. Id. 
 177. See Jay G. Ronquillo & Diana M. Zuckerman, Software-Related Recalls of Health 
Information Technology and Other Medical Devices: Implications for FDA Regulation of Digital 
Health, 95 MILBANK Q. 535 (2017). The existence of a continuing issue in software-related 
recalls demonstrates the imprecise nature of upfront review and approval, even through a 
rigorous PMA process. 
 178. See Price, supra note 24, at 443; see, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFF-THE-SHELF 
SOFTWARE USE IN MEDICAL DEVICES (1999), https://www.fda.gov/media/71794/
download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE VALIDATION 
(2002), https://www.fda.gov/media/73141/download; FDA, SAMD, supra note 176; U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR 
SOFTWARE CONTAINED IN MEDICAL DEVICES (2005), https://www.fda.gov/media/73065/
download. 
 179. See FDA, MED. DEVICES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 153; U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 154. 
 180. See, e.g., FDA, PREMARKET, supra note 176; FDA, POSTMARKET, supra note 176. The 
FDA issued postmarket guidance prior to drafting premarket requirements. There is reason 
to believe that the FDA is following as similar path with AI machines to promote innovation 
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proactive, it often is managed separately, in a non-PMA-integrative 
manner.181  
This responsive, rather than proactive, approach has raised 
some concerns. For example, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
has urged the FDA to integrate cybersecurity risk reviews into the 
premarket review process for medical devices.182 The OIG has 
identified the need for “Refuse-to-Accept” checklists, the FDA’s 
Smart template, and a dedicated cybersecurity review section, none 
of which the FDA has previously implemented.183 AI software, 
although making news headlines for years, has not been examined 
other than development of a single discussion paper in 2019.184  
Collectively, this seems to suggest that although the FDA is 
aware of new technology risks, the review process is not currently 
designed to identify and prevent cyber-kinetic safety hazards and 
poorly designed AI software.185 And, in a preemption world, 
injured patients are unlikely to recover despite an insufficient or 
non-existent review. When the MDA was passed in 1976, the 
regulatory structure, including preemption language, was 
designed to rely on deep expertise from the FDA. Today, even the 
comprehensive and rigorous PMA process does not effectively 
anticipate AI machine issues, including components and device 
review modulation or the integration of AI software into analog 
 
via responsive rather than preventative measures. See Bibb Allen, The Role of the FDA in 
Ensuring the Safety and Efficacy of Artificial Intelligence Software and Devices, 16 J. AM. COLL. 
RADIOLOGY 208 (2018). Despite the value of postmarket surveillance, it cannot solve AI safety 
issues on its own. See Price, supra note 24, at 462–64 (describing the value of postmarket 
surveillance activities both for continuous improvement and to support the inherent 
dynamism of changing, self-learning AI technologies). Nicholson Price cautions against 
relying on postmarket surveillance as a silver bullet for safety concerns. Id. 
 181. SUZANNE MURRIN, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., FDA 
SHOULD FURTHER INTEGRATE ITS REVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY INTO THE PREMARKET REVIEW 
PROCESS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES (2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-16-
00220.pdf. 
 182. See generally id. 
 183. Id. at 12. Pre- and postmarket guidance began in 2014 for cybersecurity risks, and 
although FDA personnel usually requested cybersecurity documentation for medical 
devices, the FDA “almost always cleared or approved the cybersecurity aspect of networked 
medical devices.” Id. at 11. Although cybersecurity risks are not necessarily the same as 
artificial intelligence risks, they illustrate a useful model of what can be improved with new 
technology risks. 
 184. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84. 
 185. For example, a cyber attacker that alters an AI utility that provides direction to a 
connected pacemaker may cause physical heart damage via digital means. Poor AI design 
could, as the algorithm changes, create many of the same physical safety issues when the 
algorithm drives physical function of an associated device. 
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medical devices. Based on its current structure and processes, it is 
unknown whether the FDA will direct its resources to 
comprehensively regulate AI software and whether patients be left 
with no remedy for their injuries. 
III. THE REGULATORY-TORT RISK CALCULUS 
Effective product safety regimes, including medical device 
products, balance both regulatory systems and tort recovery as part 
of a complementary model. In determining this balance, it is crucial 
to examine circumstances from the perspective of the 
administrative agency’s ability to regulate and associated costs, the 
consumer’s ability to avoid injury, and the inherent nature of the 
technology itself, which could promote latent issues due to its 
changeability or opacity. An appropriate regulatory-tort allocation 
likely includes elements of both to promote information dispersion 
for safety purposes and promote compensation for injured parties. 
A. Risk Management Legal Systems Allocate Risks Between Regulatory 
Activity and the Tort System as Complementary, Rather than 
Competing, Solutions 
Consumer protection has historically included ex ante and ex 
post solutions as part of a holistic legal framework. Ex ante legal 
solutions usually take the form of regulation and administrative 
clearance and approvals, preventative measures intended to reduce 
consumer injury. For example, manufacturers of general use 
products have a duty to warn consumers of any reasonably likely 
injury and communicate appropriate instructions for product use.  
FDA-reviewed products have, for some time, illustrated a kind 
of gold standard for preemption. The FDA is one of the best-funded 
agencies in the United States combined with both a congressionally 
defined obligation to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical 
products. The FDA, for its part, has changed its position regarding 
preemption from case to case.186 Under certain administrations, 
funding for the FDA and executive orders have influenced the 
 
 186. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents/Cross-Petitioners, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (No. 95-754), 
1996 WL 118035, at *13 (stating the FDA’s view that state tort claims generally are not 
preempted), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Riegel 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06-179), 2007 WL 3231418, at *20 (stating the 
FDA’s view that state tort claims are preempted insofar as they assert that a device in its FDA-
approved form is not safe or effective for use as directed in the FDA-approved labeling). 
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FDA’s priorities and degree of review.187 Dynamic shifts in 
regulatory direction demonstrate the limits of regulatory solutions 
to enhance consumer confidence and ensure consumer safety. 
Selecting federal agency regulation and preemption as the 
preferred solution for regulating health and safety requires a belief 
in the “rationality of the regulatory agency’s agenda and the 
agency’s assessment and allocation of risks.”188 The challenge, of 
course, is that agencies are often at the direction of the executive 
branch and subject to executive orders, creating a variable 
regulatory model, and their ability to prioritize activities is based 
on the availability of funding approved by Congress and the 
current state of the marketplace.189 Agency behavior, therefore, is 
not static.  
Legal scholars and economists have debated the merits of 
regulatory and tort approaches to regulating behavior. For 
example, economists have often argued that agencies provide 
better oversight than courts due to “specialized knowledge,” 
especially around technical subject matter.190 Specialized 
knowledge is implemented via cost-benefit analysis, which 
presumably includes risk assessment of a specific scenario or 
system-level assessment, wherein some scenarios receive more 
attention than others. It is system-level assessment that created the 
class structure for the FDA and a specialized knowledge 
expectation that likely motivated express preemption language 
under the MDA.191 Also, this expectation of specialized knowledge 
 
 187. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 207 (2011), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13150/
medical-devices-and-the-publics-health-the-fda-510k-clearance. 
 188. Id. at 153. 
 189. Richard Epstein has argued that preemption of tort claims will not necessarily 
hamper information sharing or prevent risk information from being available. See generally 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Field Preemption: Opening the “Gates of Escape” from Tort Law, J. LEGAL 
STUD. (forthcoming 20XX), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3159537. 
Epstein seems to suggest that individuals, with appropriate information, can self-select from 
a variety of options available to them. See id. (manuscript at 5–6). Unfortunately, most 
medical devices have few competing options. Further, the dynamic inscrutability of key 
aspects of AI machines makes explainability and “information” difficult if not impossible to 
produce for purposes of making an informed decision. 
 190. Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 138, 139 (1995) (citing 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in the Regulatory State, in Tort Law and the Public Interest 
(Peter Schuck ed., 1991)). 
 191. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); Sena, supra note 124. 
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likely influenced the Court’s recognition of implied preemption in 
Buckman. 
Catherine Struve has addressed the FDA regulatory-tort 
allocation question, noting that relying too heavily on preemption 
rejects the value of tort for complementing safety goals, and it 
simultaneously denies patients compensation.192 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority in Lohr, seemed to echo this concept, 
reasoning that a damages remedy in state court does not amount to 
a different or additional requirement for purposes of preemption.193 
After Riegel, however, Catherine Sharkey has questioned whether 
the Court’s view has rejected the concept of tort as a 
complementary compensatory model in favor of a competitive 
view of state and federal law.194  
Further, tort systems signal opportunities for greater regulation 
and oversight. Although regulatory agencies may carry the long-
term burden of regulation to prevent known injuries, the tort 
system offers an opportunity to understand new injuries from 
causes yet to be understood, often while drawing upon historical 
principles.195 In many cases, the tort system and regulatory agencies 
may perform a reinforcing function for each other.196 The question, 
however, is one of balance: how might a regulatory-tort system 
allocate risk appropriately for given scenarios? 
Due to resource constraints and device variability, the FDA 
cannot comprehensively regulate an industry, and the tort system 
may uncover important safety hazards that escape review.197 The 
FDA has implemented a model that includes both preventative 
 
 192. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarking Surveillance, 
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 591 (2005). 
For allocation systems without strong preemption, the tort system is seen as complementary 
to agencies for creating safety standards or signaling proposed changes. 
 193. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). 
 194. Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law 
Products Liability Claims (Part II), 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 415, 417 (2008). Typically 
Congress creates a complementary model by including not only an express preemption 
clause but also a savings clause that preserves common law liability. Id. at 416. The Court in 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009), though examining preemption related to the drug 
rather than device industry, has echoed the value of complementary models. See Efthimios 
Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical 
Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 932, 933 n.18 (noting tort remedies “‘reinforce[] a norm of 
attentiveness to safety’ and ‘serve[] as a counterweight to regulatory capture.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 195. Lyndon, supra note 190, at 169. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 141. 
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activities as clearance, continuing organizational monitoring 
obligations, and responsive actions in the case of safety or efficacy 
problems, such as recalls, replacements, and updates. However, 
when the administration desires to stimulate innovation, the FDA 
often reduces its preventative oversight activities, relying more 
heavily on manufacturers, hospitals, and device users to report 
issues.198  
The ex post tort system, then, provides additional controls to 
regulatory requirements a given organization must follow.199 
Amongst a substantial history of scholars focusing on FDA 
preemption, Struve proposes alternative options to a traditional 
tort system wherein the FDA might be part of technical review in 
federal court or the court might adjudicate safety reviews referred 
to an FDA panel.200 These proposals identify some value in the tort 
system, whether the system focuses on tort law’s signaling function 
regarding safety or considers compensation of the injured party 
who might otherwise be left without remedy. 
Although courts are often criticized for a lack of expertise in 
technical subject matters, adjudication does have its benefits. For 
one, courts have access to any number of experts and documents, 
which can explore a specific technology in depth.201 Second, courts 
have the benefit of the adversarial system, wherein additional 
information can be explored or exposed by the plaintiff and 
defendant as part of the legal process. Finally, the court operates in 
a social context, applying social principles to resolve conflicts rather 
than specifically operating according to an established agenda.202 
Sometimes, even the regulatory system cannot perform its role 
as keeper of specialized knowledge. In Struve’s example, as in 
many other proposals for preemption prior to Lohr, the FDA is 
positioned as an information broker and risk manager. For 
traditional and well-known technologies, it is less likely for 
common issues to be missed; for new technologies, the FDA may 
 
 198. Susan Kelly, FDA Details Ramp-Up of Postmarket Device Oversight, MEDTECH DIVE, 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/fda-details-ramp-up-of-
postmarket-device-oversight/542787/. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Struve, supra note 192, at 592, 591 n.14. 
 201. Lyndon, supra note 190, at 157. Certainly, the FDA has an information-generating 
function and has the ability to collect a great deal of data. The challenge, however, is that the 
FDA’s information-generating function is limited by resource constraints, specifically 
funding and qualified personnel. 
 202. Id. at 163. 
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be required to invest much more time and effort to understand the 
risk profile affecting device safety and efficacy. For these new 
technologies, agencies typically rely on known technologies to 
assess risk, which may not be accurate.203 In short, the more cutting 
edge the device, the more time the FDA will expend. And the time 
spent reviewing these devices will be based on available 
information from the manufacturer. 
However, based on the FDA’s reluctance to regulate AI as part 
of traditional device review and its lack of informative reference 
documents, the FDA is not an expert agency for AI.204 It can also be 
argued that although the FDA has created a number of software-
related documentation, it is ineffective in its review of software-
related risks.205 When an agency like the FDA does not completely 
review a technology or component of a technology, it is unclear 
whether the FDA has engaged in a system-level cost-benefit 
calculation meriting complete preemption, or whether the FDA has 
only conducted risk analysis with respect to the aspects it has 
actually reviewed.206 For example, if the FDA is conducting a PMA 
review for the bionic pancreas and fails to effectively prevent AI-
related injuries, it is unknown whether the FDA has opted not to 
review AI based on system-level risk, has not reviewed the AI 
component because the component introduces comparatively less 
risk than other technical aspects of the pancreas, or simply has not 
reviewed the AI component because it lacks the expertise.  
 
 203. Id. at 154. 
 204. In fact, the agency best positioned to regulate AI technologies or promote 
standardization is the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), which is not 
explicitly integrated into the medical device review process and does not currently perform 
any regulatory approval role. See 15 U.S.C. § 271. 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 177. I should mention that for some types of 
technologies, for example software and AI software, it is tremendously difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify potential issues at the time of PMA submission based on partial 
software functionality, especially software that may require updates or self-update after the 
time of approval. 
 206. In system-level cost-benefit analysis, AI may not present enough risk to be 
reviewed at all, but other high-risk aspects of the medical device might be fully reviewed. 
For example, an artificial pancreas that relies on AI may be reviewed as an implantable 
device under a PMA, while the AI infrastructure only qualifies as a Class II device requiring 
a 510(k). Differing technology system components reviewed separately demonstrate that the 
FDA is not taking a holistic risk approach. When AI systems are part of the system but are 
modulated, their impact on the full medical device system is not analyzed. Decisions are 
often made under conditions of uncertainty, and both regulation and responsive legal 
process provide additional information through ex ante and ex post processes. Lyndon, supra 
note 190, at 143. 
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Innovative technologies like AI are challenging to regulate 
because they are not often created by sophisticated medical device 
manufacturers. More frequently, innovative technologies are 
produced by third parties, including start-ups, that have a niche 
knowledge base and little capital, for purposes of selling the 
technology or the company to larger manufacturers.207 Practically 
speaking, this means that start-ups most frequently will spend their 
capital on development and proofs of concept, rather than 
compliance measures.208 The goal is to create something that works, 
rather than to expend capital on proving safety for a large 
population.  
By the time the FDA reviews these devices, the FDA may not 
have the expertise or time to complete a thorough review, and the 
acquiring manufacturer may not have the requisite knowledge or 
expertise to anticipate potential safety issues without prompting by 
an expert regulator. The issue, then, is one of knowledge 
dispersion.209 And agencies like the FDA do not have a monopoly 
on knowledge about innovation.210 Most specialized knowledge 
resides in the developers and experts themselves, especially for 
innovative technologies.211 
B. The Tort System Provides a Mechanism for Information Dispersion 
and Plaintiff Compensation 
The tort system, by design, functions to verify appropriate 
duties and measure whether a defendant has met its duty with 
respect to a plaintiff(s). Most frequently, and especially after Lohr, 
plaintiffs bring common law negligence tort lawsuits for products 
causing injury. Common law negligence actions require four 
elements: (1) the manufacturer has a duty, established as a 
common-law “reasonable” duty; (2) the manufacturer breaches 
that duty; (3) the breach of duty is the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff has a compensable injury 
meeting Article III standing requirements.212  
 
 207. See MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 210. 
 208. See id. 
 209. Lyndon, supra note 190, at 149–51. 
 210. Id. at 157. 
 211. Id. at 157–58. 
 212. It should be noted that some commentators on AI have suggested a strict liability 
approach to AI regulation. See generally Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the 
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The calculus for these systems considers the burden on 
organizations to meet upfront requirements, the burden of 
individual consumers to protect their own interests (caveat emptor), 
and potential impacts when consumers may recover in tort or other 
litigation. These systems consider a number of factors with respect 
to offering consumer products for sale: (1) the expense associated 
with implementing quality control or other upfront processes 
(preventative expense), (2) the cost of funding government 
oversight for these processes and overall ability of a government 
agency to effectively oversee these processes (regulator efficiency), 
(3) the ability of a consumer to select products with appropriate 
safety knowledge (consumer self-protection), (4) the potential for 
consumer injury (injury risk), (5) the market-chilling potential of 
large lawsuits to slow innovation (innovation interest), and (6) the 
direct costs of large class actions impacting business performance 
and subsequent investment (market interest).213 These factors are 
highly dependent on the industry and sub-groups within an 
industry, and the distribution of burdens between business, 
government agencies, and consumers depends on the industry, 
history of abuse or injury, and political leanings of federal and state 
legislators.  
Preemption language that limits state powers is a key hallmark 
of ex ante regulation when a federal regulator is positioned to 
effectively promote social utility due to their relative expertise. 
Preemption is an extension of the Supremacy Clause wherein 
federal law, by statutory language, meaning, or intent, ensures state 
laws do not apply under certain circumstances. Preemption is 
 
Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018) (proposing that where AI is safer 
than a reasonable person, strict liability should be replaced by a negligence standard); 
Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1315, 1331–33 (2020) 
(describing the lack of foreseeability for AI injuries needed for traditional concepts of strict 
liability). As Rebecca Crootof notes, in products liability cases, strict liability is typically 
reserved for manufacturing defects, rather than labeling or design decisions causing injury. 
See Rebecca Crootof, An Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards to Address 
Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583 (2019). 
 213. Cost discussions for high-risk devices usually are motivated via a law and 
economics approach to the regulatory-tort allocation, and typically a law and economics 
approach will reinforce preemption where an administrative agency, like the FDA, carries 
specific expertise and the risk-benefit calculus swings towards safety rather than availability. 
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption, 53 B.C. L. REV. 203, 207 (2012) 
(describing the calculus for products liability lawsuits, wherein regulatory compliance 
solutions present a net benefit “only if the social benefit from reducing risk exceeds the loss 
in utility”). 
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either direct, or explicit, in nature when Congress specifically 
includes preemption language, or it is implied when a federal court 
determines that Congress intended for preemption to apply either 
because the federal and state laws are in conflict (conflict 
preemption) or when the agency is intended to completely occupy 
a specific field (field preemption).214 The effect of both express and 
implied preemption, as applied by the courts, is that state law 
claims cannot be effectively brought, and usually preempted claims 
are dismissed before summary judgment.  
Although preemption may appear to be limiting to plaintiffs 
(and it is), the expected allocation usually involves greater focus on 
ex ante obligations, as would be the case with FDA requirements in 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), the MDA, and associated 
CFR special controls. When organizations are required to invest in 
preventative consumer or population safety, federal legislators 
have embraced preemption to ensure organizations are not paying 
twice: both for preventative measures and potentially in tort. 
Preemption has often been used as a model for establishing both 
baseline and maximum obligations for a given organization, an 
important tool to improve outcomes for consumers, such as 
medical device patients, while increasing the consistency of global 
organizational behavior. Preemption is not always a negative, 
unless the agency providing direction cannot reasonably prevent 
consumer injury. 
C. The FDA’s Risk Calculus for AI Software-Enabled Machines Does 
Not Effectively Prevent Patient Injury 
Following Lohr and Riegel, the Court has been clear about where 
tort recovery is possible: when medical devices have not undergone 
a PMA process and, if they have been approved via PMA, when 
claims are drawn specifically to FDA requirements, or parallel 
claims.215 Several scholars have criticized this line of reasoning, 
arguing that Congress’ intent with the MDA was not to establish a 
 
 214. While express preemption is specifically included by Congress in a given law, 
implied preemption is most typically constructed as field preemption, or where Congress 
has positioned an agency primarily responsible for a specific area of commerce or activity 
and when such an agency has specialized knowledge or when the state has engaged in 
activities typically reserved for a federal agency (as in Buckman). Sena, supra note 124, at 350 
(resolving that express preemption and implied preemption in Buckman would result in little 
remaining for tort recovery). 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 122–123. 
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near-bar on tort recovery both at statute and within the common 
law.216 Further, after Buckman, it appears that other claims, such as 
failure to warn or labeling claims, may still be barred on the basis 
of implied preemption if the court can find that the type of claim is 
not something the state would have typically regulated, or “state-
law claims that seek to privately enforce duties owed to the 
FDA.”217 Commentators have surmised that recovery for injuries 
caused by PMA-cleared medical device use is nearly foreclosed due 
to the exceptionally “narrow gap” occupied by the parallel claim 
exception to preemption.218 
The risk allocation presented at the system level may not seem 
problematic. Devices undergoing more truncated review, such as 
Class II medical devices and Class III medical devices that are 
deemed substantially equivalent to a predicate device, will 
undergo the abbreviated 510(k) process, and tort actions will not be 
preempted. Claims resulting from Class I medical device injuries, 
devices subject to general controls and usually not reviewed by the 
FDA at all, will also not be preempted. This means that claims for 
injuries resulting from 95% of devices marketed for sale will not be 
preempted.219  
However, when patients are injured by the highest-risk devices, 
which may use AI, their claims will most likely be preempted 
because presumably the FDA has comprehensively reviewed 
device design and attendant risks. This model may work effectively 
to minimize injury when the FDA is able to effectively review and 
prevent large-scale risks of a certain type, but it will likely leave 
patients using AI-enabled devices who have suffered injury 
uncompensated.  
The risk calculus adopted through Congress’ preemption 
language and the Court’s implied preemption analysis 
demonstrates a view of the FDA that is largely inaccurate with 
 
 216. I do not seek to retread this discussion but rather to introduce new challenges 
within the existing framework, which may frustrate the delicate tradeoffs established 
through the MDA and court decisions. 
 217. Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017) (describing the 
holding of Buckman). 
 218. In re Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Riley v. Cordis 
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009)). 
 219. Michael Drues, Are You Sure You Know the Best Regulatory Pathway for Your New 
Medical Device? MED DEVICE ONLINE (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.meddeviceonline.com/
doc/are-you-sure-you-know-the-best-regulatory-pathway-for-your-new-medical-device-
0001. 
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respect to AI machines. The FDA, at this time and likely in the 
future, is ill-prepared to effectively provide the specialized 
knowledge that will inform effective ex ante regulation 
contemplated by the MDA. It is crucial to reiterate that, based on 
the specificity of special controls, the lack of detailed guidance, and 
the existence of a singular discussion paper on AI, the FDA is 
clearly not positioned to guide manufacturers to produce safe AI 
machines. Further, the structure of the review process, including 
the expertise of FDA analysts and panel members, limits the 
potential for holistic device reviews that effectively anticipate 
potential patient risks.  
These realities, however, do not alone permit tort actions to 
move forward. In the preemption trilogy, the Court has not yet 
identified a lack of expertise on specific subject matter or 
modulated review as justification for avoiding preemption. The 
injuries in these cases have, from the Court’s perspective, been 
contemplated by Congress as a natural result of the FDA’s cost-
benefit analyses, regardless of whether those analyses were 
conducted from a position of actual expertise or not. 
IV. SOLVING THE ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT MEDICAL DEVICE 
PREEMPTION PROBLEM 
Although scholars, including this Author, have consistently 
urged better and more comprehensive and effective regulatory 
activity for AI, the FDA has not responded with useful solutions. 
AI technologies, due to their dynamic inscrutability, inherently are 
a poor fit for a regulatory clearance model largely dependent on 
point-in-time information disclosure that reasonably reflects how a 
device will operate after clinical trials. However, much of what the 
FDA does is effective for purposes of minimizing broad-scale 
injuries, especially for technologies where the FDA and its panel 
members have developed considerable expertise. 
In the current regulatory environment, tort actions may be 
desirable both as an opportunity to indirectly affect safety decisions 
and to afford plaintiffs compensation. If the FDA is not effectively 
regulating software, especially AI, for safety and efficacy, as is their 
Congressional mandate, surely any conception of an effective risk-
benefit allocation, especially one turning on regulator expertise, 
will leave plaintiffs without remedy for their injuries. And although 
it seems unlikely for most tort claims to withstand summary 
judgment, for AI machines, opportunities may not be completely 
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foreclosed. Plaintiffs harmed by AI machines may successfully 
avoid preemption with arguments related to structure, regulation, 
or technology.  
A. FDA Improvement Proposals Cannot Fully Manage AI Safety Risks 
Scholars have argued for a number of improvements in the 
clearance process, and this Author does not aim to retread these 
valuable efforts here. In particular, scholars have argued for a more 
effective and complete review process, including specific 
governance by a separate regulatory agency for algorithms,220 the 
movement of more explicit requirements and guidance to special 
controls,221 a system-based regulatory model including producers 
and users to improve quality,222 disclosure of details around AI 
design to other parties in the health system and ongoing review,223 
the competition of private entities with the opportunity for 
consumer selection,224 and the opportunity for certification by 
experts.225  
In its present state, and likely due to the FDA’s lack of resources 
to build out a complete program for AI software–enabled devices, 
external certification appears to be the most likely of ex ante 
solutions that could protect patients to a greater extent. Scholars at 
the Mercatus Center of George Mason University have advocated 
for competing certification entities that can directly communicate 
to consumers through labeling and branding solutions, consumers 
 
 220. See Tutt, supra note 62, at 107 (proposing a classification and standardization 
approach for algorithms to be reviewed according to their complexity). Following Ford and 
Price, Tutt also sees value in third-party organization certification or some public disclosure 
for purposes of inspection. Id. at 110; see also Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, 
Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 221. See Tschider, supra note 64, at 209 (proposing collaborative efforts to develop 
documents with NIST). 
 222. See Price, supra note 24, at 467–70 (highlighting the role of providers, hospital 
systems, and insurers in enhancing algorithmic quality and use). 
 223. Id. Price proposes that other players in the systems, in addition to the FDA, 
monitor ongoing algorithmic performance to prevent safety issues. This proposal offers a 
unique addition to upfront and ongoing regulation where a collaborative systems approach 
might improve overall safety. This Author proposes that perhaps another portion of this 
collaborative effort involves the courts, as needed, to address compensatory concerns. 
 224. Richard Williams, Robert Graboyes & Adam Thierer, US Medical Devices: Choices 
and Consequences, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEO. MASON U. (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Williams-Medical-Devices.pdf. 
 225. Ford & Price, supra note 220, at 19. 
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who presumably will be able to better select “safe” devices.226 In a 
more practical solution, especially for AI-enabled devices, Roger 
Allen Ford and Nicholson Price have, in relation to medical AI, 
argued for expert certification wherein trade secrets present in AI 
algorithms or processes will be preserved, though the algorithms 
themselves may be verified by third-party experts.227  
Unsurprisingly, and in an effort to control costs and promote 
innovation, the FDA has also been interested in self-regulation 
models to address these issues.228 These models include a policy for 
self-regulated “low-risk” wellness devices, where the FDA takes a 
hands-off approach to regulation,229 and the Pre-Cert for digital 
health software, where organizations pre-certify, as described in 
the TPRC discussion paper, as well.230 The proposed software to be 
regulated under Pre-Cert has a quantum of quality issues, hardly 
the medical devices requiring less FDA involvement.231 Further, the 
Trump Administration’s direction towards truncated and 
expedited reviews as an opportunity for innovation opened 
additional approval doors in addition to the traditional PMA and 
510(k) reviews. However, if the FDA cannot advance patient safety 
with full PMA reviews for certain types of technology risks, it is 
unlikely that the FDA will advance patient safety for truncated 
reviews. Essentially, third-party reviews will enhance upfront 
processes and are an excellent supporting process for FDA 
clearance. However, for adaptive software, such as AI, many issues 
simply cannot be anticipated at the time of clearance. 
 
 226. See Williams et al., supra note 224. 
 227. This proposal offers much for upfront regulatory approaches where the FDA 
cannot provide the appropriate expertise for algorithmic validation and does solve the AI 
expertise issue with respect to the algorithm itself. It does not, holistically, involve a complete 
device system analysis, which might reveal new or different risks to patients. 
 228. See, e.g., Medical Device De Novo Classification Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 63127 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2018) (proposing an alternative pathway truncated pathway to the PMA 
for new devices that are not substantially equivalent under a 510(k) process); U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., DIGITAL HEALTH SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION (PRE-CERT) PROGRAM (2020) 
[hereinafter FDA, PRE-CERT], https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/
digital-health-software-precertification-pre-cert-program (offering an alternative pathway 
for digital health software wherein the organization rather than the device is certified to 
maintain certain standards, speeding release of software on an ongoing basis). 
 229. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW-RISK DEVICES 
(2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/90652/download. 
 230. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84; FDA, PRE-CERT, supra note 228. 
 231. See Price, supra note 24, at 455–57 (examining Nathan Cortez’s work on mHealth 
apps and offering examples of health software device failure). 
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As medical devices increasingly become AI-enabled, the FDA 
appears to be even less, rather than more, involved in preventing 
safety hazards. In part due to expertise issues, approaches like a 
pre-certification process put more onus on organizations to 
internally adhere to certified processes, similar to Quality 
Management System processes in manufacturing facilities. 
However, software design, especially AI system design, is not 
manufacturing.  
While manufacturing relies on repeatability to a specific 
standard deviation, software design, especially AI engineering, is 
“fit for purpose” and personalized. A given organization, even 
with good processes and responsible developers and data 
scientists, could produce good or bad AI, because one AI utility 
could work well for one type of device or population and poorly 
for another.232 AI is designed to fulfill specific goals for a specific 
device and the people who use it. Nicholson Price has examined the 
impact of low- and high-context environments, or environments 
with a low or high degrees of specialization and resources, 
respectively, as one factor in how effective AI might be.233 It has also 
been noted that AI that are not tuned to serve certain communities 
may end up producing discriminatory (and in health, unsafe or less 
effective), results.234 If the same algorithm can be more or less 
effective under specific circumstances or with specific populations, 
it is unreasonable to believe that AI safety could be managed 
through manufacturer pre-certification processes. 
The FDA has moved away from both preventative solutions to 
increasingly truncated and self-managed solutions. And if these 
processes are dovetailed or serve as surrogates for the PMA 
process, manufacturers will enjoy an almost comprehensive 
defense for any claims brought against these devices while 
simultaneously benefitting from a less stringent FDA review and 
associated investment. The net effect, then, is that manufacturers 
benefit twice, while consumers, often patients with serious health 
conditions, lose. It cannot be ignored that tort preemption of AI 
machines under these circumstances could result in injury, 
 
 232. Third-party software usage in this context presents significantly more risk for this 
reason. 
 233. See Price, supra note 68. 
 234. Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505 (2019). 
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including death, of human beings without any opportunity for 
compensation. 
B. Tort Solutions May Promote Information Sharing and Compensate 
Victims for Largely Unknown Technologies235 
In situations where technology is largely unknown and 
substantial risks still exist after ex ante regulatory solution, the law 
has turned to torts as an effective ex post opportunity for injury 
compensation. For this reason, when innovative technology offers 
substantial public benefit but agencies lack the ability to 
comprehensively regulate either due to expertise or inherent 
technology dynamics, courts should find opportunities to avoid 
preemption and appropriately compensate victims when injuries 
result.236  
1. Preventative expense 
When examining potential factors that inform how courts may 
consider the role of preemption within the regulatory-tort 
framework, AI software-enabled medical devices demonstrate a 
need for both ex ante and ex post solutions. From the perspective 
of preventative expense, implementing a comprehensive and 
preventative regulatory quality control for software likely will not, 
if completely reliant on regulatory review, make sense for most AI-
enabled medical devices. Although the FDA has an opportunity to 
improve upfront regulatory processes by improving requirements, 
bolstering review panels and analyst expertise, and setting 
standards for AI creation, and, potentially, by independent third-
party review, there are certain realities about AI that are not cured 
by these types of processes. For example, unlocked AI is 
 
 235. It is completely unknown and truly anyone’s guess what the potential cost of 
lawsuits in the AI device space might be, but the cost of device lawsuits is well-known and 
very high. This Author makes the contention, however, that the other factors related to tort 
recovery might outweigh potential costs if this is the only factor cutting towards regulatory 
primacy. 
 236. This result is consistent with regulatory trade-offs as well as FDA communication 
on the topic. The FDA is seeking to promote innovation and reduce time to market for 
purposes of improving human life. See Scott Gottlieb, FDA’s Comprehensive Effort to Advance 
New Innovations: Initiatives to Modernize for Innovation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-and-
experts/fdas-comprehensive-effort-advance-new-innovations-initiatives-modernize-
innovation. When the regulatory process is truncated or efficacy is reduced, it makes sense 
that the court system will take the slack if injuries result. 
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dynamic.237 This dynamism means that any point in time, review, 
especially before it has been used by a large population, cannot 
accurately predict what potential safety hazards might be, at least 
those originating from the algorithm.  
Further, the inscrutability aspect of more advanced AI 
complicates ongoing and preventative monitoring, or even 
postmarket surveillance, a crucial part of the FDA regulatory 
structure that enables the FDA to take action, such as recalling 
devices to prevent further injury.238 In terms of regulatory 
efficiency, heavy upfront clearance processes and postmarket 
surveillance processes will likely reduce, but not reasonably 
prevent, downstream patient injuries, as in a typical medical device 
environment manufacturers are disincentivized to timely 
communicate safety information.239 Practically speaking, the FDA 
will likely incur a substantial burden if it is completely responsible 
for reviewing all algorithms, even if these algorithms are not 
completely inscrutable.240 
2. Regulator efficiency 
Next, although the FDA receives considerable government 
funding, the current structure for FDA review cannot, as it stands, 
appropriately anticipate AI issues in an efficient manner. At its 
core, FDA review is incompatible with the realities of AI because it 
is a linear process, designed for product development lifecycles. 
Although FDA review’s effectiveness as a risk prioritization 
mechanism can be debated, and injuries, some catastrophic, still 
occur, it is indisputably true that the MDA’s general structure has 
 
 237. See Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. on Steps Toward a 
New, Tailored Review Framework for Artificial Intelligence-Based Medical Devices, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-steps-toward-new-
tailored-review-framework-artificial; Grigg, supra note 38. 
 238. All devices that undergo a 510(k) or PMA process must engage in postmarket 
monitoring activities. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET REQUIREMENTS (DEVICES) 
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-
assistance/postmarket-requirements-devices; see Struve, supra note 192, at 599–601 
(describing the importance of postmarketing surveillance for latent issues). 
 239. See Struve, supra note 192, at 601–02. Certainly, postmarket studies, a good option 
to ensure some degree of safety for self-learning AI machines, could be made public, as 
Efthimios Parasidis has recommended. See Parasidis, supra note 194, at 935. 
 240. Allen, supra note 180. Even if the FDA has the resources to review algorithms, this 
presupposes that such algorithms are both able to be meaningfully reviewed and are locked 
rather than dynamic. 
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dramatically reduced the potential for widespread patient injury. 
For sophisticated medical device manufacturers, quality control 
manufacturing procedures, and upfront design review processes 
with experts in the field have improved patient confidence and 
ultimately created a marketplace for these devices, spurring 
economic growth.241  
Medical devices reviewed by the FDA under a PMA are, by 
definition, new and innovative technologies demanding expert 
knowledge, and the FDA does not, and may not desire to have, 
comprehensive expertise.242 The use of AI not only in diagnostic 
software but also integrated into functioning medical device 
software amplifies this knowledge demand because the rate of 
technological change for AI software is so incredibly high. Even AI 
experts cannot keep up with the variety of models and methods 
created for AI, and the cost of complete FDA regulation meriting 
broad preemption will likely lead to inefficiencies of cost and 
availability delays inconsistent with innovation goals.  
3. Consumer self-protection 
From the perspective of consumer self-protection, labeling will 
not be able to effectively advise physicians or patients of the risks. 
If the FDA and AI experts cannot fully appreciate the extent of 
potential risks, how will manufacturers knowledgeably 
communicate risks to physicians and patients? FDA labeling 
requirements not only identify approved uses (“on-label” uses) but 
also provide specific warnings to prescribing physicians and, in 
some cases, directly to patients. If FDA experts cannot anticipate or 
understand potential cyber-kinetic risks or the potential for AI 
design flaws due to the algorithm’s dynamic inscrutability, it is 
unlikely these risks could be effectively communicated on a label in 
a curative manner. It is unlikely that physicians, trained in a specific 
 
 241. In part, this may be explained not only by regulatory action, but also by standards-
bearing organizations that collectively develop baseline standards, such as the International 
Organization for Standards or the American National Standards Institute. See Paul H. Rubin, 
Markets, Tort Law, and Regulation to Achieve Safety, 31 CATO J. 217, 222 (2011). 
 242. It should be noted that even if the FDA took a comprehensive stance on AI, the 
reality is that the FDA cannot anticipate every safety issue, and the technology itself would 
frustrate this model to some degree. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337–38 (2008) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the former chief counsel of the FDA: “Regulation cannot 
protect against all possible injuries that might result from use of a device over time. 
Preemption of all such claims would result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer 
protection . . . .”). 
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field of medicine, would understand risks posed to their patients 
by an algorithm.  
Labeling also provides information to physicians and patients, 
who rely on labels and associated marketing materials to compare 
products. Although superficially AI technologies might appear to 
pose the same challenges as device software, the ephemeral nature 
of dynamically inscrutable AI makes labeling tasks nearly 
impossible, dramatically reducing the ability of physicians to 
advise patients of potential risks to make an informed decision. The 
foundational problem for relying on patients and even physicians 
to select safe products relates to information asymmetries both in 
the PMA process and in practical expertise.243  
Unlike general use consumer products, usually patients are 
dependent on physicians’ expertise to recommend the appropriate 
device and advise of potential risks. This relationship is so well 
developed that courts apply a doctrine that prevents patients from 
successfully bringing injury claims related to information in 
labeling or warning, the learned intermediary doctrine. The learned 
intermediary doctrine, recognized in a majority of states, prevents 
patients from bringing these actions precisely because a physician 
is responsible for explaining any risk to the patient and the patient 
is not the audience for such warnings and labels.244  
The physician likely has limited knowledge with respect to the 
technology as well, especially for latent design defects that may not 
appear obvious on the surface. For example, a physician who is 
trained in remote surgery using CorPath may advise a patient of 
the potential risks, but these risks will likely be related to the 
surgery itself, rather than CorPath’s AI design and potential risks 
related to the AI software itself. If CorPath includes a third party’s 
design for the AI software, the manufacturer may not have fully 
vetted or disclosed these details to the FDA.245 In other 
 
 243. See Rubin, supra note 241. 
 244. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (1966) (establishing the term 
“learned intermediary”). The rationale for this doctrine usually involves the following: 
(1) the physician is in a superior position to give a warning and can provide an independent 
medical decision, (2) manufacturers lack effective means to communicate with the patient, 
and (3) imposing a duty to warn upon the manufacturer would interfere with the physician-
patient relationship. See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763–64 (Ky. 2004). 
 245. This notion is exemplified by what Paul Rubin calls a “Type 1 error,” or when 
overregulation results when individuals are injured but an agency has been positioned as 
primary regulator in a field. In this error, the injury prompts heavier regulation based on the 
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circumstances, the FDA may have confidential information from 
the manufacturer or third party from the PMA process, but those 
details included in the PMA may not be available to physicians or 
consumers. Regardless of whether the FDA, manufacturer, or third 
party have the most information, physicians and patients are 
comparatively in a less beneficial position to appropriately avoid 
potential risks.246 The presence of AI amplifies the level of 
information asymmetry under these circumstances due to the 
algorithm’s dynamic inscrutability.  
4. Injury risk 
The aforementioned factors might have less bearing if AI 
software posed little risk to patients. Unfortunately, AI software 
and its infrastructure dramatically increase potential injury risks to 
patients because medical device risk models have not taken into 
account the risk of automation bias in human-interfaced AI 
machines.247 Medical devices no longer pose risk solely due to their 
inherent physical characteristics or installed in-device software. AI 
infrastructure demands tremendous computing power through 
distributed architectures, such as the cloud, internet connectivity, 
and large and changing data sets. Dynamic inscrutability not only 
is a moving target for purposes of understanding the technology’s 
current risk profile, but the inscrutable nature of the algorithm 
prevents even its creator from understanding the AI’s decision. 
Increasingly more often, AI technologies do not rely on humans to 
validate a recommendation and take action; the most cutting-edge 
technologies, such as advanced surgical robotics, will make any 
number of decisions for the user. While these technologies will 
likely save lives, they may also introduce different, and sometimes 
more serious, risks to patients.  
 
expectation that the agency can or does have complete information to prevent injury. See 
Rubin, supra note 241, at 227. 
 246. One lens for evaluating information asymmetries involves the economic 
implications of competition between products. When information is available, consumers in 
general might be better able to consider alternative options and perform their own cost-
benefit analyses. However, FDA-regulated markets are not competitive in the traditional 
sense either, because usually few options are available for a given drug or device due to the 
cost of entry in the market and the role of patent for establishing limited monopoly, amongst 
others. See Stephen R. Munzer, Risk and Reward in Stem Cell Products: A New Model for Stem 
Cell Product Liability, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 125–26 (2012). 
 247. See Gretton, supra note 80. 
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C. The Existing FDA Review Structure Offers Opportunities for 
Avoiding Preemption 
When the FDA cannot effectively regulate a specific technology, 
an opportunity exists for torts to complement the regulatory 
structure and provide compensation to injured parties. In all 
inquiries, courts would need to accept a micro, rather than macro, 
view of risk-benefit decisions. This means that courts would need 
to examine each case as a specific risk-based inquiry by the FDA. 
Practically speaking, courts could not “write off” a lack of review 
or insufficient review as part of a systematic risk calculus for the 
medical device industry as a whole. This model works well for AI 
software-enabled medical devices, but the three-part inquiry 
described in the remainder of this section could also reinforce FDA 
regulatory efficacy for other technology innovations while 
simultaneously providing some compensation for parties injured 
in the name of innovation. 
There is plenty of reason to believe that Congress intended for 
plaintiffs to have some right of recovery, the least of which because 
they did not explicitly bar any recovery. As Justice Ginsburg noted 
in her Riegel dissent:  
Congress’ inclusion of a preemption clause in the MDA was not 
motivated by concern that similar state tort actions could be 
mounted regarding medical devices. Rather, Congress included 
§ 360k(a) and (b) to empower the FDA to exercise control over 
state premarket approval systems installed at a time when there 
was no preclearance at the federal level.248 
Without more specific MDA preemption language, it would be 
“difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, 
remove all means of judicial recourse.”249 Although the FDA has 
been positioned as a central regulator under the MDA and the 
agency must “weig[h] any probable benefit to health from the use 
of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such 
use,”250 it does not necessarily follow that recovery is all but 
foreclosed. The Buckman decision, however, has opened up the 
potential for the Court to find implied preemption under certain 
 
 248. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340–41 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 249. Id. at 337 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
 250. Id. at 318 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(2)(C)). 
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circumstances, which could become a slippery slope effectively 
amounting to field preemption.251 It is centrally important for AI 
software that at least some opportunity to recover is permitted in 
circumstances where the FDA has not developed the appropriate 
expertise, when truncated processes are used, or, due to the 
technology itself, when the FDA cannot effectively and 
comprehensively regulate. 
Although the preemption trilogy may not leave much room for 
avoiding preemption, the existing FDA review structure, 
regulatory design, and the degree of similarity or difference from 
the submitted technology may offer some opportunity for success 
in surviving summary judgment.252 A three-part inquiry for claims, 
focused on Lohr’s recognition of a parallel claim preemption 
exception, would likely offer a more complete review than 
indiscriminately applied preemption, and dismissal ab initio, would 
provide.253 
 
 251. Although the Court recognized implied preemption under a conflict preemption 
analysis, it is possible to envision an argument for field preemption, due to the 
comprehensive nature of FDA reviews. Drug cases offer a more likely candidate for field 
preemption, due to the non-existence of express preemption language for drugs while the 
MDA does contain such language. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of 
State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 55 (2008). Nevertheless, without 
due care by the courts, scope creep regarding conflict preemption could practically result in 
field preemption, even under the MDA. 
 252. This section does not attempt to fully describe how a prima facie case could be 
successfully argued or how, for example, expertise should be solicited or judgments fulfilled. 
Rather, this section has one aim: to demonstrate how a plaintiff injured by an AI machine 
might successfully avoid preemption under the MDA. Indeed, this section follows the 
relatively clear direction from Lohr in its presumption that parallel claims are not completely 
foreclosed under implied preemption, both based on the Court’s reasoning and on the 
practical realities of the FDA’s actual documentation related to AI and its broad regulatory 
scope. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996). 
 253. This is no trivial task. Courts are split on the question of parallel claims, despite 
recognition in Lohr and Riegel. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, for example, have 
demonstrated a more liberal view of parallel claims, whereas the Eighth Circuit has held that 
such claims are expressly preempted if the plaintiff cannot definitely demonstrate a federal 
claim specifically referring to the device. See Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and 
Preemption: A Defense of Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA 
Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1207–14 (2011). In Tarloff’s view, for both doctrinal and 
public policy reasons, courts should adopt a more flexible definition of requirements. Id. at 
1219. From a regulatory-tort allocation perspective, parallel claims support a compensatory 
model of consumer protection and complement the FDA’s regulatory function. Id. at 1219–
26. 
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1. Structural inquiry 
The structure of FDA reviews could offer an opportunity for 
courts to resolve tort actions in favor of surviving summary 
judgment. First, the principle thrust of Lohr was to distinguish 
between resource-intensive reviews where the FDA had fully 
reviewed a particular medical device in a PMA process and more 
passive reviews, like the 510(k) process. The introduction of new, 
abbreviated reviews could increase the speed to device access. For 
example, the FDA’s De Novo review takes devices that would 
normally go through a full PMA process and instead permits a 
truncated review more similar to the 510(k) process for devices that, 
in the manufacturer’s view, do not present substantial risk.254 The 
software self-certification process and discussion paper prescribe a 
system-level or manufacturer review process, rather than a design-
focused process, for AI diagnostic software.255 In these cases, courts 
should continue to uphold Lohr’s outcome: that anything short of a 
full review should be preempted. Without a more severe approach 
to restricting preemption, it is possible that some slippage could 
occur, resulting in preemption of truncated review processes. 
In a similar vein, the Shuker decision has marked another 
opportunity for courts to consider the impact of preemption 
slippage for component parts.256 In Shuker, the Third Circuit, in 
acknowledging that the part of a device that caused injury was 
independently reviewed via the PMA process, also noted that for 
entire device systems, components are usually listed within the 
PMA process for review.257 Although this was not the case in 
question, it raises important issues of the role components play 
within systems that have been reviewed by the FDA.258 
Because AI will likely be considered a module of larger systems, 
the risk of slippage for these systems is quite high. It is not hard to 
imagine that a defendant medical device manufacturer might assert 
 
 254. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III DESIGNATION 
(DE NOVO) (2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/
evaluation-automatic-class-iii-designation-de-novo (showing the De Novo review process). 
 255. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84. 
 256. See Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, 885 F.3d 760 (2017). 
 257. Id. at 766. 
 258. Although for purposes of this Article, the Author focuses on PMA-approved 
processes that may include 510(k) approved components, which is most likely for AI 
systems, certainly the reverse arrangement might also complicate medical device tort 
litigation. 
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preemption for AI injuries if an entire AI machine has been 
reviewed under a PMA, even if the AI infrastructure, as a 
component part, received a 510(k). For injuries implicating specific 
components, courts could instead examine whether the component 
itself was reviewed via a separate PMA process and, if not, whether 
the manufacturer can demonstrate a comprehensive review of the 
component as part of the system that received premarket approval. 
Although this approach might require a manufacturer to reveal 
confidential information from the FDA approval process to 
determine the degree of component re-review under the PMA, it 
might be reasonable to expect such a showing to preempt tort 
claims under these circumstances.259  
For example, if the bionic pancreas’s AI software malfunctions 
and causes injury, the court would first look to determine whether 
a full PMA had been conducted on the bionic pancreas as a system. 
After that had been verified, the court would next determine 
whether the AI software component that caused injury was 
reviewed as part of the bionic pancreas system PMA, whether the 
AI software was reviewed in a separate device PMA, or whether 
the AI software was classified separately and was not 
independently reviewed as part of the bionic pancreas system 
PMA. If one of the first two conditions is met, the court could verify 
that the structural inquiry was satisfied. If the third circumstance 
applies and the software component is alleged to have caused the 
injury, tort claims would not be preempted. 
2. Design inquiry 
Both Lohr and Riegel hinged on preemption language in the 
MDA preempting state laws with “different or additional 
requirements.” In both cases, the Court focused on the process of 
the PMA versus the 510(k) as providing sufficient requirements for 
purposes of preemption. However, the Court did not go into great 
detail, in either case, of what could qualify as requirements, nor did 
it examine the veracity of such requirement review by the FDA. 
Construing requirements in a more inclusive definition and 
 
 259. This approach might also reasonably balance stricter pleadings standards 
advanced by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which likely has made bringing products liability suits for 
medical device injuries much more difficult given the confidentiality of the FDA-
manufacturer process. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). If plaintiffs must meet 
heightened pleadings standards, manufacturers may need to demonstrate more to escape 
liability. 
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requiring demonstration of actual review might tighten a fairly 
loose preemption standard via the parallel claims exception.260 
As an initial matter, both Lohr and Riegel left open the possibility 
of recovery under parallel claims despite Justice Scalia’s skepticism 
regarding a jury’s ability to determine an appropriate cost-benefit 
model in Riegel’s comparatively more preemption-friendly 
majority opinion.261 Parallel claims, established under Lohr, permit 
plaintiffs to avoid MDA preemption by demonstrating that their 
injury resulted from non-compliance with a federal requirement. 
For purposes of plaintiff recovery, especially for technologies that 
are not yet comprehensively regulated under traditional CFR 
requirements due to a lack of expertise, the definition of 
“requirement” should be construed broadly.  
It is well known that often the FDA considers not only special 
controls but also guidance as it reviews the PMA file. If a plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the manufacturer did not adhere to guidance, 
and the FDA has developed guidance on AI and software topics, it 
may be possible for a plaintiff to recover.262 Courts could also look 
to broad language in the special controls, such as the example given 
earlier in this Article, “adequate consideration of privacy and 
security issues in the system design,” to permit further inquiry 
beyond a motion to dismiss and summary judgment.263 This 
inquiry might enable a plaintiff to determine, in discovery, 
whether a manufacturer did or did not adequately consider 
such issues in its design of an AI-enabled medical device. 
Where language is broadly written, the FDA and other experts 
could explain what compliance with that language would 
entail. This model cabins potential conversations by 
restricting them within the Lohr parallel claims exception, 
while maintaining the exception’s breadth to maximize fact-
 
 260. This model is consistent with Catherine Sharkey’s agency reference model, 
wherein details of the FDA’s views would be useful in determining the compatibility of these 
views with state law tort claims and would necessarily include some deference to the FDA’s 
position on certain matters. See Sharkey, supra note 194, at 418. Although Sharkey directs this 
conversation at the largely unaddressed area of implied preemption, the concept can easily 
be integrated into express preemption analysis. 
 261. See Sharkey, supra note 194, at 417–18 (quoting Justice Scalia’s majority opinion). 
 262. Guidance is often positioned as the FDA’s most current views on a topic and is 
tied to special controls. Although not legally binding, it could be used as an interpretive tool 
for understanding often broadly written special controls and industry reasonableness in 
implementing such controls. 
 263. See supra notes 169–171 and accompanying text. 
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specific inquiry and relying on institutional statutory 
interpretation. 
A parallel claim inquiry could be further reinforced by 
permitting a fact-specific inquiry, based on FDA documentation, 
into whether a specific requirement has been reviewed. In most 
preemption cases, the successful approval of a medical device via 
the PMA process does not go much further to demonstrate 
preemption. However, if the court views its role in tort as ensuring 
appropriate safety for patients, it could engage in a more fact-
specific inquiry to determine whether the FDA factually reviewed 
a design requirement that ultimately led to patient injury. For 
example, evidence of a review could include specific sheets 
requiring disclosure of information related to the requirement (e.g., 
a “checklist”), versions of PMA documentation illustrating changes 
to a specific design element, or copies of FDA correspondence on 
the topic. Although this would likely demand resources from the 
FDA and the manufacturer to demonstrate the FDA’s actual 
review, this model could be used to better probe the validity of the 
parallel claim argument.264 In this model, manufacturers and the 
FDA could not make an argument of confidentiality while 
simultaneously arguing for preemptive effect.  
Functionally, the court would conduct a secondary analysis 
from the perspective of validating the parallel claims in 
requirement and actual review only if the first inquiry, the 
structural inquiry, supports preemption. The court would first look 
to the existence of some requirement, construed in favor of the 
plaintiff, to support the claim. The court’s direction, then, would 
construe a common law negligence action as a type of negligence 
per se claim, wherein the basis for duty and breach is established 
through a type of institutional comity.265  
For example, if a plaintiff alleges negligence due to a bionic 
pancreas’s malfunction or poor design, the court would look to 
special controls and guidance to determine whether these 
 
 264. A parallel claims model could actually cut both ways: if the FDA did review a 
given requirement, the plaintiffs would be preempted in their claims. If the FDA did not 
review a given requirement, the plaintiffs would still need to prove the remainder of their 
prima facie case to recover. 
 265. Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957, 965 (2014). 
The benefit to deferring to standing regulatory standards, at least from a parallel claims 
perspective, is that the torts system, then, can be reinforcing rather than competitive with 
regimes that have an institutional advantage. Id. at 967. It might also draw additional 
attention to the insufficiency of existing standards, prompting the FDA to take action. 
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documents apply to the AI used in the bionic pancreas. If such 
documents, broadly construed, exist, the court would then conduct 
a fact-specific inquiry into whether the FDA reviewed the device’s 
design with respect to these requirements. If the FDA sufficiently 
reviewed the design for specific safety considerations, courts could 
uphold preemption. If the FDA did not sufficiently review these 
requirements, the court could deny any preemption defense, which 
would balance regulatory and compensatory interests in the 
parallel claims context.266 Although this may not be a perfect 
solution for plaintiffs, it rewards good regulatory behavior and 
promotes effective investment in upfront processes. 
3. Technology inquiry 
The AI technology itself may also provide an opportunity for 
plaintiffs to successfully survive preemption. In the third prong of 
inquiry, courts should evaluate whether the technology that 
allegedly caused the injury has changed materially from the 
technology reviewed in the PMA, and whether the manufacturer 
timely submitted a required PMA supplement. For AI, this analysis 
would likely involve reviewing the type of AI used when the 
plaintiff sustained an injury. Ultimately, not all AI is alike: some AI 
software may be designed using test data and refined in clinical 
trials, only to be launched in that form for the medical device. These 
locked forms of AI software are, by definition, static rather than 
dynamic. If the FDA has actually reviewed these devices in a full 
PMA process and requirements have been applied to the AI, these 
devices likely pose less risk for patients. 
However, if software or other technologies are designed to be 
dynamic on an ongoing basis, as is common in unsupervised 
machine learning AI and most neural networks, the court could 
presume that the technology is different from its approved form. 
Then, the court could shift the burden to the manufacturer to 
demonstrate that the device is not different from its approved form. 
If the manufacturer successfully demonstrates a lack of material 
change, the manufacturer would survive the proposed prong three 
inquiry. If the manufacturer does not, plaintiffs will survive 
 
 266. The goal in an effective compensatory model is not necessarily to always provide 
compensation but to ensure appropriate cost-benefit analyses have been conducted and that 
safety measures have been considered. 
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preemption and will be permitted to bring claims, assuming such 
claims meet pleading requirements. 
The question of material change has a crucially important 
impact for FDA medical device preemption. If the medical device 
or device component has changed so substantially that it could be 
a newly functioning device yet is similar to its predecessors, it 
would be treated as a substantially equivalent (SE) device for 
purposes of initial FDA review. Under an SE review, the FDA 
would likely require a limited 510(k) submission, which, according 
to Lohr, would not preempt later tort recovery. While in practice, a 
manufacturer could submit a PMA supplement to amend the initial 
PMA report, courts could create a legal fiction of 510(k) status. If a 
510(k) status exists, plaintiff claims are not preempted. There is 
some technical justification and background that could support this 
kind of legal fiction. First, manufacturers are starting to release AI 
machines that are next generation versions of analog and non-AI-
enabled medical devices, outfitted with new AI infrastructure.267 In 
many cases, these may be submitted as 510(k) submissions because 
the manufacturer has argued for substantial equivalence to a 
predicate device. This fiction could inform court behavior when the 
physical device has not been altered but the AI has effectively 
changed device functionality. 
Alternatively, if the medical device changed materially, the 
manufacturer would have needed to submit a PMA supplement, 
which would have been reviewed by the FDA. If the manufacturer 
did not submit such a supplement, the FDA would not have 
reviewed the device at issue, referring this third prong back to the 
second prong of inquiry, where likely the FDA would not have 
actually reviewed the design against the requirement. 
Both of these approaches address an important issue noted in 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Riegel, that “[t]he Court’s holding does 
not reach an important issue outside the bounds of this case: the 
preemptive effect of § 360k(a) where evidence of a medical device’s 
defect comes to light only after the device receives premarket 
approval.”268 Although not specifically contemplating AI 
 
 267. See Allen, supra note 180. 
 268. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 n.1 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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dynamism, latent defects and fast-track technology innovation 
certainly would trigger this important question.269 
D. The Viability of Tort Actions Requires Further Inquiry 
By focusing on the challenging space of preemption for 
innovative technologies, this Article has not addressed the 
potential viability of tort actions, such as products liability actions, 
specifically for AI software. Although scholars are beginning to 
examine the challenges and potential solutions for successfully 
arguing these cases, the area of AI software torts should receive 
additional attention. Initial areas of inquiry could include the 
relative responsibility of manufacturers for their AI software when 
the algorithm itself is inscrutable, contributory negligence in the 
form of patient-operated AI-enabled medical devices, or the 
challenges in discovery due to algorithmic complexity, 
inscrutability, or trade secrecy. Importantly, the inscrutability of 
medical device AI causes specific problems for successfully 
demonstrating proximate cause. 
CONCLUSION 
AI and other innovative technologies like it inherently 
complicate regulatory-tort allocation: manufacturers are not 
required to demonstrate that AI-enabled medical devices will 
adequately prevent consumer injury in the clearance process, yet it 
is likely that consumers will also not be able to recover for their 
injuries in tort, either. The equation, therefore, is not remotely what 
Congress aimed for in the MDA’s passage. The FDA’s reluctance 
and lack of expertise in this area, as well as software’s inherent 
qualities, such as its dynamic inscrutability and reliance on 
distributed systems, makes a comprehensive and effective ex ante 
solution nearly impossible for innovative, adaptive technologies.  
The tort system is an integral part of both effective safety 
regimes and consumer injury compensation. An effective 
regulatory-tort system for new technology, including AI-enabled 
 
 269. Catherine Sharkey has also identified this issue with respect to pharmaceutical 
labeling defects, where the label is nonetheless incorrect after a latent design issue comes to 
light. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Drug Advertising Claims: Preemption’s New Frontier, 41 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1646 (2008). The question of labeling versus design defects for purposes of 
preemption is an important distinction given how the courts have responded to labeling 
issues for products (more likely to preempt) than for design defects, assuming such defects 
can be sufficiently narrowly tailored to a federal requirement. 
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medical devices, balances interests of manufacturers and 
consumers through effective regulation and opportunities for 
recovery when regulatory solutions fail. Courts can champion new 
technology development by permitting legitimate parallel claims in 
the AI-enabled medical device context, which may change 
medicine for the better, all while reinforcing consumer confidence.  
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